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REHABILITATING TERRITORIALITY
IN HUMAN RIGHTS
Austen L. Parrish*

ABSTRACT
For many years, territorialprinciples anchored an international
system organized around nation-states. Recently, however, the human
rights movement has sought to change the state-centric focus of
internationallaw and overcome the limitations of a system where the
territorialstate is the primary actor. The field of human rights has
promoted a new legal orthodoxy thatplaces the person at the center of
the internationallegal system. Within this orthodoxy, non-state actors
play a prominent role, unilateraldomestic lawsuits are promoted, and
territorial borders give way when necessary for humanitarian
intervention. In contrast, territorial conceptions of internationallaw
are viewed as outdated and ill-equipped to deal with a globalized
world. Prevailing wisdom in the human rights community, at least
among academic scholars, now suggests that non-territorialmodels of
governance are better in protectingand enforcing human rights.
This Article challenges that wisdom. Globalization and territorial
governance can be consistent in the field of human rights. The Article
advances two principle arguments. First, concepts of territorial
sovereignty and the multilateralism upon which international law
operates achieve an underappreciated balance between state and
individual rights that often serves as a foundational prerequisitefor
human rights to flourish. The rejection of territorialitymay undermine
the hard-fought gains the human rights movement has achieved
Second, in the long run, strong territorialstates will remain criticalto a
world system that promotes human dignity. A disaggregated state,
* Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Southwestern Law School. The author is grateful to
Ronald Aronovsky, Kristen Boon, Bryant G. Garth and Christopher Whytock for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts. The Article also benefited from comments received, and discussions
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at the 2009 Annual Meeting of The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. The
International Section on Human Rights selected the Article for presentation at the 2011
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting. Special thanks to Michael
Bauer and Maria Daatio for their research assistance.

1099

1100

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

where globalized, American-style interest group politics control, is
unlikely to be favorable to human rights over time. The Article
concludes that territorial approaches to global governance have
greaterpromise than many assume to jump-startinggreaterrespectfor,
and enforcement of human rights. The human rights community would
benefit from re-embracingtraditionalmultilateral legal solutions as the
primary way of achieving meaningful reform.
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INTRODUCTION

For centuries, territoriality served as a cornerstone of an
international system organized around Westphalian concepts of state
sovereignty, formal equality and nonintervention. As classically
understood, only nation-states defined by their territorial borders could
formally participate in and were the subjects of international law.' The
human rights movement, however, recently has sought to change this
state-centric focus and overcome the limitations of a system where the
state is the primary actor. 2 Although human rights law is compatible
with the territorial nation-state, 3 the modem human rights movement
I See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 37-38 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed. 2003); see also infra Part I.A.
2 A minority of theorists argue that the state has outlived its usefulness. See, e.g., Rosa
Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1172-74
(2005). For a good overview of the post-territorial state and the rise of human rights culture, see
Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1055-59 (2007).
3 See infra Part HI.B; see also Richard J. Goldstone & Erin P. Kelly, Progressand Problems
in the MultilateralHuman Rights Regime, in MULTILATERALISM UNDER CHALLENGE? POWER,
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has attempted to create a new legal orthodoxy that places the person at
the center of the international legal system. 4 Territorial conceptions of
international law are now commonly viewed as antiquated.5 And
increasingly, commentators argue that "the traditional doctrine, whereby
(Edward Newman et al. eds., 2006)
(describing how human rights operates in a multilateral system); Louis Henkin, International
INTERNATIONAL ORDER, AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 259

Human Rights Standards in National Law: The Jurisprudenceof the UnitedStates, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 189 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco

Francioni eds., 1997) ("[Human rights] were not designed to 'internationalise' the relation
between individual and society. Rather, . . . the international human rights movement seeks to
persuade every state to recognise these rights and to guarantee them within its own constitutional
and legalsystem.").
4 See, e.g., Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox
of International Law?, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 379, 386 (2007) (describing human rights as

emblematic of "the new legal humanism" that "compete[s] with the classical understanding of
international law as based upon territorial sovereignty"); Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Q
of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 513 (2009) (arguing that sovereignty is being ousted as
the first principle of international law and that territorial sovereignty is not "merely limited by
human rights, but should be seen to exist only in function of humanity"); W. Michael Reisman,
Editorial Comment, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84 AM.

J. INT'L L. 866, 872 (1990) (describing how human rights "shift[ed] the fulcrum of the system
from the protection of sovereigns to the protection of people"). For additional recent articles that
discuss this trend, see William Magnuson, The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline of
Sovereignty: FreeSpeech Protection Under InternationalLaw, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255,

256, 260-74 (2010) (arguing that international law should not be beholden to "the now-eroded
concept of state sovereignty" and urging an expansion of the responsibility to protect); and
Timothy William Waters, "The Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining":
Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL

STUD. 25, 26 (2009) (noting how at conferences it is common to hear predictions that "the state as
we know it [will] not be around in fifty years" and that "there already are or soon will be other,
more decisive actors"). Cf A. Claire Cutler, CriticalReflections on the WestphalianAssumptions
of InternationalLaw and Organization:A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 133

(2001) ("[T]he fields of international law and organization are experiencing a legitimacy crisis
relating to fundamental reconfigurations of global power and authority.").
5 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded InternationalLaw and the ConstitutionAbroad,

110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 247 (2010) (describing territorial theories as antiquated); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & David T. Zaring, Extraterritorialityand Discovery, in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 72, 73 (1997) (arguing that "tidy circles demarcating

national jurisdiction" based on territory have become "either impossible or meaningless");
Catherine E. Sweetser, Humanity as the A and 92 of Sovereignty: FourReplies to Anne Peters, 20

EUR. J. INT'L L. 549, 550 (2009) ("There is a growing consensus that the traditional notion of
sovereignty, which gave states inviolable territorial boundaries except for diplomatic protection
claims and self-defence, is now outdated."); cf DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL
AND BEYOND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 128-29 (new ed. 2006)

(describing scholarship that believes "international law is just an 'anachronism' or historical
hangover" and that "Westphalian sovereignty is 'a tyrant's charter'). This rejection has
paralleled attacks on territorial concepts in other areas of the law too. See, e.g., Paul Schiff
Berman, From InternationalLaw to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485,

487 (2005) (arguing that "we need to move beyond the limiting framework of international law"
and criticizing territorial conceptions of law); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality,and
the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631 (2009) (discussing how

territorial underpinnings of legislative jurisdiction are challenged in an age of globalization); Ralf
Michaels, TerritorialJurisdictionAfter Territoriality,in GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION 105

(Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004) (exploring globalization's challenges to territorial
jurisdiction).
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international law imposes duties and responsibilities and confers rights
only upon states, not individuals, is untenable." 6
The rejection of territoriality has appeared in several forms.
International law scholars have sought to universalize human rights and
diffuse the power of the nation-state so that enforcement and promotion
of human rights are no longer as tied to territorial sovereignty.7 The
rights of the individual are "seen to be 'above' the sovereignty of
nation-states and are thus important markers of the extra-territoriality
that globalization ushers in." 8 The human rights movement has also
sought to harness the power of institutions and organizations formed
both above and below national governments. 9 Invoking universal
jurisdiction, advocates have turned to domestic courts to remedy and
regulate human rights abuses worldwide.10
In turn, many have
discounted traditional multilateral solutions, believing that the future of
human rights enforcement lies primarily in domestic, not international,
systems." In the field of humanitarian intervention, scholars have
6 Rafael Domingo, The Crisis ofInternationalLaw, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1543, 1550
(2009); see also KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY INAMERICAN LAW 8 (2009) (describing the "widespread belief

today that territoriality is under siege" and noting that "[s]ome see the relentless rise of a
borderless, globalized world that is dismantling traditional sovereignty"); Domingo, supra, at
1544, 1551 (noting that "we are witnessing a slow death" of the territorial state, that the "state is
suffering an irremediable and prolonged agony," and that there exists a "crisis of territoriality" as
concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and the nation-state "have become obsolete"); Alfred Van
Staden & Hans Vollaard, The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-TerritorialWorld?,
in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 165, 165 (Gerard Kreijen et al.

eds., 2002) ("The classical concept of State sovereignty, i.e. the notion of territorially rooted
political authority, which is exclusive and undivided, has increasingly become subject to criticism
from different political quarters.").
7 Cf Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Law, Politics, and the
Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW:
TOWARDS ACOSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 1, 5 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A. Rodriguez-

Garavito eds., 2005) (describing how "a copious literature on 'global governance' has developed
which inquires into the transformation of law in the face of eroding state power and the
decentralization of economic activities across borders" and an "approach [that] focuses on nonstate-centered forms of regulation allegedly capable of best governing the global economy").
8 RONALDO MUNCK, GLOBALIZATION AND CONTESTATION: THE NEW GREAT COUNTER-

MOVEMENT 141 (2007).
9 See, e.g., Lauren Carasik, "Think Glocal, Act Glocal": The Praxis of Social Justice

Lawyering in the Global Era, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 55 (2008) (describing the current movement
to incorporate international human rights into social justice lawyering).
10 The seminal case is Filartigav. Pena-Irala,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Michael
D. Ramsey, InternationalLaw Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV.

INT'L L.J. 271, 272 (2009); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102; see infra notes 69-85.

11 See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International
Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 228, 228 (Hurst
Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992) (explaining that human rights protection and enforcement begins
primarily with domestic courts); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of
InternationalLaw is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 350

(2006) (arguing that international law must harness the power of national institutions to achieve
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urged military action to protect human rights even when doing so is
prohibited under classical conceptions of international law. This does
not mean that, as a practical matter, territorial states have become
marginalized in global politics-far from it. But the fascination with
non-territorial models of governance is now pervasive and the models
are described in romantic terms. 2
But should human rights groups discard territoriality? How robust
a role should territoriality play in international law and global
governance? Should human rights advocates cultivate linkages and
leverage power within territorial states or maintain greater independence
from them? Now is an opportune time to examine these questions and
rethink the relationship between international human rights and more
traditional, territorial conceptions of international law. In a wide range
of contexts, scholars have renewed their attention to territoriality as a
concept in law worth examining.' 3 Extraterritorial regulation has
remained a controversial topic,14 the extraterritorial reach of the United

global objectives); cf Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic
Democracy, and the Evolution of InternationalLaw, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 59 (2009) (describing

how national courts are beginning to more aggressively engage in the interpretation and
application of international law); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global
Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67 (2009) (systematically analyzing the global impact of domestic
courts).
12 See, e.g., Robert Howse, The End of the GlobalizationDebate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV.

L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2008) (book review) (explaining how the "erosion of familiar structures
fixed within the territorial nation-state model of human organization" has led to feelings of
"exhilaration at new possibilities of connectedness and human flourishing"); see also Harold K.
Jacobson, InternationalInstitutions and System Transformation, 3 ANN. REV. PoL. SCI. 149, 150-

51 (2000) (describing stylized traditional visions of world government and new ideas for
transforming an international system based on nation-states).
13 John Fabian Witt, Book Review, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 569, 569 (2010) (reviewing KAL
RAUSTIALA,

DOES

THE

CONSTITUTION

FOLLOW

THE

FLAG?

THE

EVOLUTION

OF

TERRITORIALITY INAMERICAN LAW (2009)) ("The territorial state is the foundation for virtually

all law in the modern world.... And yet precisely because it is so ubiquitous, it often evades the
radar of contemporary scholarship. We have massive literature on any number of arcane areas,
but too little good work on the territorial state that lies at the base of it all."); see also John Gerard
Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47

INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993) (famously noting how the concept of territoriality has been studied so
little). For some recent good analysis, see RAUSTIALA, supra note 6; RESTRUCTURING
TERRITORIALITY: EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES COMPARED (Christopher K. Ansell &
Giuseppe Di Palma eds., 2004); and TERRITORIALITY

AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF

GLOBALIZATION (Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006). Cf LEGAL BORDERLANDS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds.,

2006) (examining the role of law in the construction of U.S. borders and the impact that
globalization has had on American studies scholarship).
14 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (assessing the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws). See generally Austen Parrish, The Effects
Test: Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008) [hereinafter Parrish, The

Effects Test] (reviewing the literature and debates surrounding extraterritorial regulation). For
two good recent articles on extraterritorial regulation, see John H. Knox, A PresumptionAgainst
Extrajurisdictionality,104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351 (2010); and Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and
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States Constitution has once again come to the fore in academic
debates,' 5 and issues of extraterritoriality are commonly the subject of
panels at academic conferences. 16 In short, territoriality has taken a
prominent place in legal scholarship.' 7
Reexamining the role of territoriality in human rights is also timely
for another reason. While the human rights movement has grown, its
limitations have dwarfed its successes. Although in the 1980s and
1990s certain developments momentarily suggested that global
universalism was taking hold,' 8 overall the human rights movement has
been impotent at crucial moments. A vast array of human rights abuses
continue unabated, 19 nations and non-state actors remain largely
Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for ExtraterritorialApplication of US. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV.

110 (2010).
15 See Christina Duffy Burnett, A

Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After

Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 973 (2009) ("Questions concerning the extraterritorial
applicability of the Constitution have come to the fore during the 'war on terror."'); see also Jose
A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure:Problems in the ExtraterritorialApplication of

US. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660, 1660 (2009) (developing "an approach for
evaluating whether a particular constitutional provision should have overseas application in a
particular case"); Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded InternationalLaw and the Constitution Abroad,

110 COLUM. L. REV. 225 (2010) (describing the role of international law in the context of
extraterritorial constitutional application); Kal Raustiala, The GeographyofJustice, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2501 (2005) (exploring the geographic reach of the U.S. Constitution in the context of
Guantanamo).
For earlier discussion, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); and Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991).
16 See, e.g., Symposium, Beyond Borders: Extraterritorialityin American Law, 39 Sw. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011); Symposium, Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1;

Symposium, Territory Without Boundaries, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 547 (2009). For closely related
topics, see Symposium, A Collision of Authority: The U.S. Constitution and Universal
Jurisdiction, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 301 (2010); and The Boundaries of Intellectual
Property Symposium: CrossingBoundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 (2009).
17 See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV.

843 (1999) (describing the role of territoriality in U.S. law); Saskia Sassen, Territory and
Territoriality in the Global Economy, 15 INT'L Soc. 372 (2000) (describing globalization's

impact on national territory and territoriality). This is true for non-legal disciplines too. See, e.g.,
Neil Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in
Globalization Studies, 28 THEORY & SOC'Y 39 (1999); Stuart Elden, Missing the Point:
Globalization, Deterritorializationand the Space of the World, 30 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT.

GEOGRAPHERS 8 (2005).
18 For some, the 1998 Pinochet arrest in Chile signaled that global civil society could hold
dictators accountable for their crimes against humanity. And the United States' use of human
rights to justify interventions in Kosovo, Rwanda, and later, in part, Iraq were urged by some as a
triumph. See Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J.

INT'L L. 237, 260 (1999) (arguing that the traditional principles and values underlying
international law are under challenge by the notion that fundamental human rights must be
respected); cf William J. Aceves, Liberalism and InternationalLegal Scholarship: The Pinochet
Case andthe Move Toward a UniversalSystem of TransnationalLaw Litigation,41 HARV. INT'L

L.J. 129 (2000) (describing changes in the international system).
19 DEBRA L. DELAET, THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSAL
PRINCIPLES INWORLD POLITICS 5 (2006) (explaining that a "gap between rhetoric and reality"
has meant that "[t]orture, political repression, genocide, abject poverty, discrimination, and
inequality have been a standard feature of life for many human beings throughout this century,
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immune from serious reforms 20 and, even if viewed as a temporary
setback, for almost a decade the United States appeared ambivalent to
international human rights. 2 1 Compared to neo-liberalism, which has
continued to dominate in the commercial arena, human rights has been
marginalized as a model for global governance. For supporters of the
human rights movement, the lack of success is troubling and demands
examination.
Against this backdrop, this Article challenges the notion that an
international legal system based on territoriality is outdated or
antithetical to progress in human rights. I aim to make two
contributions. First, I question the wisdom of forcefully rejecting
territoriality and traditional, positivistic, sovereignty-based conceptions
of international law. I suggest that the concept of territorial sovereignty,
and the multilateralism 22 upon which territorial-based international law
operates, achieves an underappreciated balance between state and
individual rights that often serves as a foundational prerequisite for
human rights to flourish. The rejection of territoriality in the long-term
may threaten to undermine the hard-fought gains the human rights
movement has achieved. Second, I suggest that the victories realized in
before and after the Cold War"); Goldstone & Kelly, supra note 3, at 262 (noting that "it must be
conceded that the current regime has not generally succeeded in preventing serious human rights
violations globally and that this failure threatens the legitimacy of the regime," and that "[tihe
current human rights regime is suffering from a serious decline").
20 DELAET, supra note 19, at 4-5; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Restoring America's Human
Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635, 645 (2007) (lamenting the "striking
ineffectiveness [of U.S. human rights policy] in curbing abuses in four categories of countries: (1)
in the face of genocide in Darfur, Sudan; (2) as committed by our major allies, especially those in
the War on Terror; (3) in the so-called 'Axis of Evil' countries-North Korea, Iran, and Iraq-as
well as in Afghanistan, notwithstanding our costly military interventions in two of those
countries; and (4) in such traditional geopolitical rivals as China, Russia, and Cuba"). See
generally AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2010: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS, at xv (2010) (describing challenges to human rights recognition and
criticizing how powerful states such as China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey, and the United
States have "stood aside from, if not deliberately undermined, international justice efforts").
21 For criticism of this ambivalence, see PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND
THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES (2005). See also Bryant G. Garth, Rebuilding

InternationalLaw After the September 11th Attack: Contrasting Agendas of High Priests and
Legal Realists, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 3, 3-4 (2006) (explaining how after 9/11, the Bush
Administration believed "[i]nternational law needed to be put in the service of the War on Terror
or ignored" and detailing a "series of anti-international law decisions"); Harold Hongju Koh,
Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2354 (2006) ("America's new diplomatic strategy
emphasizes strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism, characterized by a broad antipathy
toward international law and global regime-building through treaty negotiation."); cf Louis
Henkin, U.S. Ratification ofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost ofSenator Bricker, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 341 (1995).
22 I use a minimalist definition of multilateralism. See John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism:
The Anatomy of an Institution, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF
AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 3, 8 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993) ("At its core, multilateralism
refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain
principles.").
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the human rights field are not attributable to the purported universal,
transcendental nature of human rights, but largely to the support from
powerful states, and organizations and groups within those states. This
is the very sort of power that the human rights movement at times
condemns, but which is essential to its continued viability. While a
weaker territorial nation-state may in the short-term seem desirable, in
the long-term strong states are critical to a world system that promotes
and respects human dignity. In contrast, the new transnational leaders
of globalization--corporations, the media, interest-groups, religious
organizations, as well as environmental, philanthropic and other nongovernmental actors-are less accountable for the policies they
promote. Although in the short-term the human rights movement may
achieve temporary gains through garnering a greater voice on the
international stage for sub-state actors that are supportive of the human
rights agenda, over the long haul those voices are likely to be drowned
out by competing voices. Stated differently, a disaggregated state
where globalized American-style interest group politics control, on
balance and over time, is unlikely to be favorable to human rights.
Before proceeding, a point to underscore: While I attempt to
reexamine the strategic decisions made in the human rights movement
to distance itself from territorial-based international law, my purpose is
not to undermine that movement. 23 Often those critiquing human rights
come from a perspective hostile to the human rights agenda. 24 At least
in American academia, the debates commonly mimic the predictable
domestic clashes between liberal and conservative groups in the socalled culture wars. 25 And if not this, then the criticism is of
international law generally, with assertions that it overly threatens

23 This Article is not focused on critiquing the substance behind the liberal human rights
agenda or debating whether a Western approach to human rights is normatively desirable (or at
least not undesirable). Criticism of the agenda or of its practice has been the subject of
tremendous debate. Rather, this Article explores what strategies are best to achieve the liberal
human rights agenda assuming that agenda is normatively desirable.
24 See, e.g., Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism,the Globalized Judiciary, and
the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REv. 345, 353-54 (2005) (criticizing judicial
globalization and moral universalism). For criticism of transnationalism and certain aspects of
international human rights law, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, ForeignSovereign
Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 9 (2009)

[hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy ofInternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000); Jack Goldsmith, Should International
Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 327 (2000); and Phillip R.
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986).
25 See the discussion in YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN

AMERICAN STATES 61-72 (2002) (describing how the human rights movement in the United
States was closely allied with Cold War and the foreign policy establishment).

2011]

REHABILITATING TERRITORIALITY

1107

domestic sovereignty 26 or is otherwise illusory. 27 In contrast, I am
largely supportive of the goals and values the international human rights
movement promotes. I instead wish to push back softly on the now
received wisdom over the means to achieve those goals. Liberal
internationalists and human rights scholars alike should pause before
advocating that we dismantle the traditional territorial frameworks of
international law. A territorial approach may well have greater promise
than many assume and rehabilitating territoriality in law may be a path
to jump-starting greater respect for, and enforcement of, human rights.
The Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, I trace the recent
history of human rights and the reluctance to embrace territoriality as a
desirable feature of international law. I use three examples to show how
international law scholars in conjunction with the human rights
movement have challenged and weakened a state-centric, territorial
model of international law. In Part II, I sketch out some of the
limitations of non-territorial approaches to global governance. While
non-territorial approaches have an understandable appeal, I explain why
they are problematic for effective human rights enforcement over the
long term and for the promotion of democratic self-governance.
Finally, in Part III, I describe how and why territorial models of global
governance can continue to serve us well, and how globalization and
territorial governance are not inconsistent in the field of human rights.
In so doing, I push back on cosmopolitan conceptions and legal
pluralism. I encourage the human rights community to more readily
promote traditional multilateral legal solutions. 28
26 See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False
Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9 (describing critics of international law); see also
Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between InternationalLaw and Democratic Sovereignty, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 322-23 (2001) (describing concern that international law is "making a sure
and steady encroachment on democratic sovereignty, affecting the United States in particular");
Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971,

2006 (2004) ("[lInternational law today rests on a fundamentally antidemocratic conception of
fundamental law.").
27 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International

Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1804 (2009) ("The force of international law is thus largely an
illusion.... It is international relations or international politics dressed up as law ... [and
merely] a rhetorical, political trope .... ); see also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that international law is often rhetorical and

only obeyed when convenient to powerful states); ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL
LEGALISM (2009) [hereinafter POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM] (criticizing
international law).
28 This Article builds on a body of prior work that critiques extraterritorial laws in a number
of other contexts. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Litigating Canada-US.
Transboundary Harm: International Environmental Lawmaking

and the

Threat

of

ExtraterritorialReciprocity, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2007) (exploring territoriality issues in the
environmental context); Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality,FadingSovereignty, and the

Development of Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Parrish,
Changing Territoriality] (exploring territoriality and indigenous rights); Austen L. Parrish,
Reclaiming InternationalLaw from Extraterritoriality,93 MINN. L. REV 815 (2009) [hereinafter
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THE MODERN HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The narrative begins at the end of the Second World War with an
international system founded on territorial state-centric principles. It
ends in the present, where the traditional territorial limits of
international law have been displaced in part by extraterritoriality-an
approach the human rights movement has championed.
A.

TerritorialBeginnings

The international order immediately after the Second World War
was built as a way to ensure (or so it was hoped) international peace and
stability. At the time, international law focused on state-to-state
relations and the rights and obligations of territorial states. 29 Only the
territorial state could enter into treaties. 30 Customary international law
bound only states. 3 ' Only states had standing before most international
institutions. 32 In this state-centric way, the international system aimed
Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw] (exploring trends in international relations that reject
territorial models of governance); Parrish, The Effects Test, supra note 14, at 1455 (critiquing
extraterritorial laws in the private regulatory context); Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Dja vu:
Extraterritoriality,InternationalEnvironmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to CanadianU.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363 (2005) (exploring
territoriality in the environmental context).
29 Centralized statehood, constructed in what is known as the Westphalian mold, was the
framework for all political privileges in international law. See generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 294 (Kenneth W.

Thompson ed., 6th ed. 1985) ("[Tlhe Treaty of Westphalia... made the territorial state the
cornerstone of the modern state system."); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42
AM. J.INT'L L. 20 (1948); John H. Herz, Rise andDemise of the TerritorialState, 9 WORLD POL.
473, 480 (1957) ("From territoriality resulted the concepts and institutions which characterized
the interrelations of sovereign units, the modern state system.... Only to the extent that it
reflected their territoriality and took into account their sovereignty could international law
develop in modern times.").
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333;
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19.

31 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 156-58 (2d ed. 2005).
32 Only states may be members of the United Nations. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1. Only
states have standing before the World Court. See Statute of the International Court of Justice
art. 34, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. See generally Christoph Schreuer, The
Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigmfor InternationalLaw?, 4 EUR. J.INT'L
L. 447, 448 (1993), explaining:
The classical sources of international law depend on the interaction of States in the
form of treaties and customary law. Diplomatic relations are conducted between
States. Official arenas, like international organizations and international courts, are
largely reserved to States... . Central concepts of international law, like sovereignty,
territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-defence or permanent sovereignty over
natural resources all rely on the exclusive or dominant role of the State.
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to protect the sanctity of Westphalian territoriality and, by doing so,
limit conflict and war.33
This focus on the territorial state gave rise to three related and selfreinforcing tenets: territorial integrity, sovereign equality and
nonintervention. 34 To protect territorial integrity, international law
rules developed to restrain aggression that might impair a state's
sovereignty. 35 Territorial sovereignty became the "idea that there is a
final and absolute political authority in the political community ... and
no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere." 36 Power ended at the
border. 37 Law only applied in state borders to peoples within the
state, 38 as did constitutional protections. 39 These ideas were not new;
33 RAUSTIALA, supranote 6, at 19.
34 Amitav Acharya, Multilateralism,Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics, in

MULTILATERALISM UNDER CHALLENGE? POWER, INTERNATIONAL ORDER, AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE, supra note 3, at 95 (describing territorial principles); Stuart Elden, Contingent
Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26 SAIS REV. 11, 11 (2006)

("Since the end of World War II, the international political system has been structured around
three central tenets: the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence for domestic
jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of existing boundaries.").
35 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state...."); see also G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14,
1974) (prohibiting the use of armed force to threaten the territorial integrity of another State);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at
121, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
36 F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (1966); see also Ruggie, supra note 22, at 15.
37 Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality:InternationalRelations and American Law,

in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 13, at 219
(describing how law and land were tightly and integrally linked); Mathias Albert, Territoriality
and Modernization 3 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.unibielefeld.de/soz/iw/pdflalbert_3.pdf ("The history of the modern system of states is a history of
defining political power in exclusively territorial terms."). Power has not always ended at the
border. In England, for example, prior to the creation of the monarchial state, a concept of
territorial sovereignty did not exist. See Ruggie, supra note 13, at 150.
38 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) ("The laws of no nation can justly extend
beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to
control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction."); see also S.S.
"Lotus" (Fr./Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) ("Now the first and
foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a
permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of
another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory . . . ."); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19, 21
(Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834) (noting that "every nation possesse[d] an exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within its own territory," and "it would be wholly incompatible with equality and
exclusiveness of the sovereignty of any nation, that other nations should be at liberty to regulate
either persons or things within its territories").
39 For a description of this history, see Raustiala, supra note 15, at 2506 ("[T]he protections
of the Bill of Rights are not untethered from the territory of the United States. Rather, they are
spatially bound: operative only within the fifty states and other territories unequivocably [sic]
possessed by the United States."); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force
in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . . .").
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they had been core concepts of international law for centuries, at least
since the modem State replaced the Holy Roman Empire. 40 But they
took on renewed force in the immediate post-war period.41
Human rights initially sat comfortably within the territorial
approach of positivistic international law. 4 2 Leaders in the human rights
movement sought to harness the power of the territorial state to protect
against genocide and other atrocities that had occurred with Nazi
Germany. And human rights were vindicated through a state-based
system of international norms created through multilateral treaties. 43
The United States led efforts to establish the United Nations and its
state-centric approach as a way to "promot[e] and encourag[e] respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,"44 In the 1940s and
1950s, territoriality was also seen as an essential way to protect against
human rights being used strategically in the Cold War.45 Fledgling
democracies in turn began supporting international human rights as a
way to legitimize and support new democratic regimes. 46

40 See Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the
Responsibilityto Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 981 (2009) (describing the history); Ruggie, supra

note 13, at 149 (describing modem conceptions of territoriality with the "nonexclusive territorial
rule" characteristic of medieval Europe); see also EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS

(James Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. Wash. 1916) (1758); THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
41 Acharya, supra note 34, at 99-105 (describing how the United Nations and its Charter
"universalized the norms of equality of states, territorial integrity and nonintervention").
42 Aceves, supra note 18, at 130 ("This emphasis on the nation-state and the 'international' is
clearly-and surprisingly-found in the field of human rights."); see also Louis B. Sohn, The
New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L.
REV. 1 (1982) (describing changes to the international legal system after World War II).
43 Heinz Klug, TransnationalHuman Rights: Exploring the Persistence and Globalizationof
Human Rights, I ANN. REV. LAW. & SOC. SCI. 85, 86 (2005) ("[T]he traditional approach to
human rights focuses first on the emergence of particular human rights claims and their
incorporation through international legal processes into binding legal norms."); see also LOUIS
HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
44 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002).
45 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 25, at 61-72 (describing how the human rights
movement in the United States was closely allied with the Cold War and the foreign policy
establishment); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race
Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 321, 326 (2010) (noting

concerns that "international human rights law would develop in ways antithetical to U.S.
conceptions of rights and that it would be used by the Soviet bloc in its ideological campaign
against the United States").
46 For a discussion of this, see Andrew Moravesik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:
DemocraticDelegation in PostwarEurope, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000) (describing the origins of
human rights from a liberal approach to international law and relations).
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DiscardingTerritoriality

While territoriality 47 was initially viewed as a way to guarantee
human rights, it later became seen as a barrier. Traditional multilateral
law based on territoriality was challenged as the number of non-state
actors dramatically expanded, domestic courts began playing an
increasingly important role in global governance under an expanded
understanding of universal jurisdiction, and the sanctity of territorial
borders were ignored in the name of humanitarian intervention. As the
Cold War wound down, the international legal framework began to
change, and the human rights agenda transformed with it.
1.

The Rise of Non-State Actors

The first challenge came in the form of a change to the number and
scope of actors acting transnationally and autonomously from the
nation-state. As information, capital and people began to move across
national boundaries with less restriction, non-state actors began to
expect to participate in international affairs. 48 Over the past three
decades, the number of human rights-related nongovernmental
organizations exploded. 49 A "plethora of national and international
47 I refer here mostly to territorial theories related to adjudicatory and enforcement
jurisdiction. In many ways, prescriptive jurisdiction remains the domain of the state, at least
formally.
48 Peter J. Spiro, Nonstate Actors in Global Politics, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 808 (1998) (book

review) (reviewing literature describing the rise of nonstate actors in international law); see also
Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263, 265 (2006)

("Domestic interest groups, transnational corporations, and global networks of NGOs all take part
of the new global, political, and social constellation that defines the age of globalization."); AnneMarie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System, in
GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW

LEGAL ORTHODOXY 12, 13 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) [hereinafter Slaughter,
Breaking Out] (noting the "veritable explosion of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
advancing their own causes by pushing, challenging, and monitoring states and seeking
recognition as autonomous international actors"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2631 (1997) (book review) ("As sovereignty has
declined in importance, global decision-making functions are now executed by a complex rugby
scrum of nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, regional compacts, nongovernmental
organizations, and informal regimes and networks.").
49 Jacobson, supra note 12, at 155 ("In the first decade of the twentieth century there were
fewer than 200 INGOs; by middle of the 1990s, there were more than 20,000." (citation
omitted)); see also Kerstin Martens, Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in InternationalLaw,

10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-6 (2003) (describing the "enormous growth" and noting
that "NGOs have become increasingly transnational" with "[t]he human rights sector currently
record[ing] the greatest number of NGOs"); Peter J. Spiro, Accountingfor NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L
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institutions, organizations, and campaigns designed to oppose and
developed. 50
overcome particular human rights problems"
Transnational networks 5 ' became seen as a key way to mobilize support
for human rights by gathering and disseminating information about
human rights abuses, educating the public, defining human rights norms
and lobbying governments. 52
Several hundred nongovernmental organizations currently exist for
the purpose of human rights advocacy.53 A growing number of those
are organized across and without regard to national boundaries. 54
Beginning as early as the 1970s, increased attention began to be paid to
transnational relations as distinct from interstate relations.55 While the
international human rights movement did *not fully exist before the
1970s, by the late 1970s a movement had fully formed. 56 By the late
1990s, over one hundred nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had
"general consultative status with the United Nations, and almost 1500
had a more limited status." 57 The result? The "proliferation of
transnational activities ... produced an international field of human

L. 161, 161 (2002) [hereinafter Spiro, Accounting for NGOs] ("Non-governmental organizations

have enjoyed a phenomenally rapid rise on the world scene.").
50 Klug, supra note 43, at 88.
51 Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations,27 WORLD POL. 39, 41 (1974) (describing the development of networks that drive
international policy); see also MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale,
TransgovernmentalNetworks and Emerging Powers, in RISING STATES, RISING INSTITUTIONS:
CHALLENGES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 48-62 (Alan S. Alexandroff& Andrew F. Cooper eds.,

2010).
52 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 166-72 (2000).
53 Jackie Smith et al., GlobalizingHuman Rights: The Work of TransnationalHuman Rights

NGOs in the 1990s, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 379 (1998) (describing the results of a survey of nearly 300
transnational human rights organizations).
54 For an early discussion, see David P. Forsythe, The Red Cross as Transnational
Movement: Conserving and Changing the Nation-State System, 30 INT'L ORG. 607 (1976); see

also Martens, supra note 49, at 5.
55 See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Robert 0. Keohane &
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World
Politics,25 WORLD POL. 333 (1973).
56 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, ConstructingLaw Out of Power: Investing in Human
Rights as an Alternative PoliticalStrategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE INA GLOBAL

ERA 354, 360-64 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) [hereinafter Dezalay & Garth,
ConstructingLaw Out ofPower] (describing how the field of international human rights began to
develop); see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 51, at 79 ("As recently as 1970, the idea that the

human rights of citizens of any country are legitimately the concern of people and governments
everywhere was considered radical."); id. at 89-102.
57 Jacobson, supra note 12, at 155.
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rights with substantial autonomy from national states and legal
systems." 58
The number of organizations in itself, however, was not overly
remarkable. Rather, it was the degree of influence NGOs gained in
political processes at a global level that was striking. 59 NGOs have long
existed, 60 but what changed was the willingness of states and
international institutions to formally recognize a NGO voice in the
architecture of international institutions.6 1 "[S]ignificant evidence"
exists to show that NGOs "have joined states as participants in
As Anne-Marie Slaughter
organised international relations." 62
describes it:
[NGOs] are making a mockery of the old-fashioned and always
highly stylized image of states as the only or at least the principal
actors in the international system. NGOs seek increasingly formal
status in international organizations and as recognized subjects of
international law. They want litigation rights before international
and supranational tribunals. 63
The change of focus away from the territorial state has had ripple
effects. The participation of non-state actors has been significant
enough that some states have even sponsored or created their own
human rights organizations as a way to exert greater influence in the
international arena.M And as the number of NGOs has grown, the way
58 Dezalay & Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power, supra note 56, at 354; see also
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE
STATE (Jackie Smith et al. eds., 1997).
59 See NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (Claude E. Welch, Jr. ed.,
2001); NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds.,
1996); "THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD": THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS IN THE U.N. SYSTEM (Peter Willetts ed., 1996).
60 Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation:NGOs and InternationalGovernance,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997). Not only have NGOs been around in multiple forms, but so too
has the idea of transnationalism, transnational networks, and declining territorial state power.
Slaughter, Breaking Out, supra note 48, at 14.
61 Id. at 12-13 (describing the proliferation of NGOs as "[t]he central phenomenon
transforming both public and private international law in the 1990s" and stating that "few
developments could be more important for the social construction of international legal rules than
a change in the relevant 'actors"'); cf Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, supra note 49, at 162
(arguing for full and formal recognition of NGOs as a way to increase accountability). For
criticism on legitimacy grounds, see Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning
Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of
InternationalCivil Society, 11 EUR. J. INTL L. 91, 112-19 (2000).
62 Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, NGO Participation in the International Policy
Process, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 543, 543 (1995).
63 Slaughter, Breaking Out, supra note 48, at 16.
6 Olivier de Frouville, Domesticating Civil Society at the United Nations, in NGOS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 71 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Luisa Vierucci

eds., 2008) (describing a servile society); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Conclusion: Return on the Legal
Status of NGOs and on the Methodological Problems Which Arise for Legal Scholarship, in
NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY INFLEXIBILITY?, supra,at 204-05 (noting problems
of captured NGOs).
For a more optimistic account, see Sonia Cardenas, Sovereignty
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legal rules develop has changed. 65 The concept of rights has similarly
expanded: "Human rights is increasingly seen as extending to a range of
social, economic, and cultural rights such as the right to food and to
housing-thus defining much more broadly the obligations of a state to
its citizens." 66
2.

Domestic Courts and Universal Jurisdiction

The chipping away at territoriality, however, lay not just in the
promotion and rising influence of non-state actors. The assault also
occurred by virtue of changes to jurisdictional doctrines and the use of
domestic courts to provide civil remedies for human rights violations.67
In the United States, this began most prominently in the 1980s with
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute and the expansion of universal
jurisdiction. 68
Transformed? The Role of National Human Rights Institutions, in NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ACTORS AND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS POLITICS 27
(Noha Shawki & Michaelene Cox eds., 2009).
65 Kathryn Sikkink, TransnationalAdvocacy Networks and the Social Construction ofLegal
Rules, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A
NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY, supra note 48, at 37 (describing the increasingly important role that
NGO networks play in producing international norms).
66 Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the
Possibilitiesof Cause Lawyering: An Introduction,in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A
GLOBAL ERA, supra note 56, at 3, 11; see also CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 89 ("Only during the

1990s did the ethical and moral dimension of international policy-making become treated as a
legitimate factor, which could and, in fact, should influence and shape national and international
policy-making.").
67 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.

L.J. 1397 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1124
(2000) ("[J]udges see one another not only as servants or even representatives of a particular
government or polity, but as fellow professionals in a profession that transcends national
borders."); The Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights a Practical Reality, in 8
DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 267, 268 (Commonwealth Secretariat ed., 2001)

(describing how human rights transcend national political systems and how domestic courts can
protect those rights); Peter Zumbansen, Beyond Territoriality:The Case of TransnationalHuman

Rights Litigation, 2005 CONWEB, no. 4, 2005, http://www.bath.ac.uk/esml/conWEB/
Conweb%20papers-filestore/conweb4-2005.pdf (describing the use of civil litigation to redress
alleged human rights abuses). This does not mean that territoriality is a moribund concept in all
areas. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? InternationalChoice of Law in Action,

84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 788-89 (2009) (finding that qualitatively, "territoriality persists in
international choice-of-law decisionmaking").
68 This trend occurred beyond the human rights context as transnational litigation expanded in
a whole host of areas. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is TransnationalLitigation Different?, 25 U. PA.

J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297, 1300 (2004) (describing the expanding number of transnational cases);
Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996) (describing
how transnational public law litigation has allowed international law to seep into domestic legal
systems). In recent years, U.S. courts have applied a wide range of domestic laws
extraterritorially to solve global challenges. See generally Mark A. Behrens et al., Global
Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 165 (2009) (explaining how other countries are
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The doctrinal history is well-known. In 1980, with the landmark
Filartigav. Pena-Irala69 case, the Second Circuit catapulted the Alien
Tort Statute 70 to the forefront as a tool to remedy human rights
abuses. 7 ' What began as a law intended to avoid unnecessary conflict
between the United States and foreign countries 72 developed first into a
law to remedy human rights abuses by foreign officials, then to a law to
penalize corporate malfeasance and, finally, to a law that attempts to
constrain U.S. governmental action.73 Through now well-studied cases
such as Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 74 Kadic v. Karadzid,7 5 Doe

adopting reforms that mimic American-style litigation); Nico Krisch, InternationalLaw in Times
ofHegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping ofthe InternationalLegal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L

L. 369, 403 (2005) [hereinafter Krisch, Unequal Power] (explaining how the United States "took
an early lead in applying its own law to situations with little connection to itself other than a
widely defined 'effect,' and it has succeeded in reshaping (or at least destabilizing)" traditional
jurisdictional conceptions); Parrish, Reclaiming International Law, supra note 28, at 846-48
(listing areas of law where the United States regulates conduct abroad through the extraterritorial
application of domestic law); cf Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56

STAN. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003) ("National courts, too, are increasingly being called upon to apply
international law and to interact with these international courts and with the courts of other
nations."). For an empirical analysis challenging the claim that the United States is experiencing
a transnational litigation explosion, see Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping
System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011). For an argument urging more extraterritorial litigation,
see Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (2008) (supporting increased extraterritorial litigation, and arguing that jurisdictions with
strong courts should provide incentives to attract foreign litigants).
69 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For an in-depth discussion of the case, see RICHARD ALAN
WHITE, BREAKING SILENCE: THE CASE THAT CHANGED THE FACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004).
Harold Hongju Koh has described Filartiga as the "Brown v. Board of Education" for
"transnational public law litigants." Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation,
100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991).

70 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The Alien Tort Statute was enacted in 1789 as part of the first
Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350). Three other statutes also provide jurisdiction for U.S. courts to hear human rights
claims: the Torture Victim Protection Act, an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
and a provision of an antiterrorism initiative. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602. See generally Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing InternationalLaw: The Comparative
and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 438-39 (2002) (describing modem statutes that

provide jurisdiction in U.S. courts for human rights claims).
71 Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-10

(2002) [hereinafter Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga] (describing the case and its implications);
Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to Limit
Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 173-77 (2004) (describing the case and its
progeny).
72 See generally Kenneth C. Randall, FederalJurisdiction over InternationalLaw Claims:
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 15-21 (1985).
73 Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 105 (2005); see also JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. COURTS 55-64, 164-274 (2008) (describing the history of
Alien Tort Statute litigation).
74 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
5 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
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v. Unocal Corp.,76 and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,77 among others,7 8
domestic human rights litigation has evolved.
What is astonishing in this evolution is how, in a very short span of
time, a change in mindset occurred. 79 Before the 1980s, the idea that
foreign nationals could sue or be sued in domestic courts for conduct
abroad was almost unheard of.80 In the 1980s and 1990s, however,
scholars welcomed the use of domestic courts and universal jurisdiction
as a means to promote accountability for human rights violations.81
Human rights advocates made efforts to "deploy domestic courts around
the world to implement the human rights policies not only of their own
countries but of the international community as a whole." 82 As a result,
human rights litigation underwent a "significant expansion, both in
terms of the number of cases filed as well as the scope of the claims
raised."83 Domestic courts-cooperating together across national
boundaries-began to shape international norms. 84 While liberal
internationalists tended to cheer the trend, neo-realists and
sovereigntists condemned it as an attempt at world government by

76 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (post-settlement order).
77 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
78 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 941 (2001); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996).
79 Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A HypocriticalApproach, 3 BUFF.

J. INT'L L. 261, 269 (1996). Gibney observes:
It is remarkable to think that it was only slightly more than a decade and a half ago that
the prospects of bringing to trial torturers and murderers from Paraguay or Ethiopia or
Indonesia or Guatemala or Haiti or anywhere else seemed completely out of the realm
of the possibility. Much has changed in a relatively short period of time. The U.S. has
now opened its courts to those who have suffered human rights abuses ....
Id.

80 Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 10, at 104.
81 See, e.g, AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 14 PRINCIPLES ON THE EFFECTIVE
EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (1999); see also LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (2003) (noting that a

"veritable 'transnational advocacy network'
implementation" of universal jurisdiction).

organizes

and strategizes

for ... effective

82 Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming
Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 216 (2005).
83 Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs ofInternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.

457, 458 (2001).
84 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 11 (explaining how domestic courts are beginning to
engage more aggressively in the interpretation and application of international law); Melissa A.
Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretative Incorporationof Human

Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 652-94 (2007) (describing methods by which domestic
courts incorporate international human rights law); see also ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS, supra note 3; PETER HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE: LAW, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2009); BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (2d ed. 2008).

For a general

discussion of this phenomenon, see Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw, supra note 28, at 85256.
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judicial elites.85 Some scholars now suggest that American-style
litigation is the future in this area, 86 as transnational public law
litigation has become more common in other countries too.8 7
3.

Humanitarian Intervention

Also indicative of the move away from a territorial approach has
been the use of humanitarian intervention in the name of protecting
human rights. 88 The primary focus of international law post-World War
II was initially to avoid armed conflict. 89 States were prohibited from
85 POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM, supra note 27, at 207-25, 227-28 (arguing

that American legal academics are drawn to European visions of international law and the
willingness to allow judges to make policy and "regulation by litigation"); Kersch, supra note 24,
at 346-47.
86 Anne Bloom, Taking on Goliath: Why Personal Injury Litigation May Represent the
Future of TransnationalCause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL
ERA, supra note 56, at 96; see, e.g., Jennifer Levine, Note, Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation:
Adjudicating on "Foreign Territory," 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 101, 102, 116 & n.83

(2006) (describing transnational human rights litigation as the "wave of the future" and citing
cases in Canada, the United Kingdom, Greece and Italy).
87 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with
Democratic Principles,92 GEO. L.J. 1057 (2004), recounting:
In the past decade, criminal complaints or investigations have been instituted before
courts in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Senegal,
Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom for atrocities in Europe, Africa, and South
America ... [and] criminal complaints have been filed in Belgium .. . against current
or former leaders of Chad, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Ivory Coast, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, the United States, and other countries.
Id. at 1059-60; see also Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The EmergingRecognition

of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 149-53 (2006) (explaining how concepts
of universal jurisdiction are emerging outside the United States); Stephens, TranslatingFildrtiga,
supra note 71, at 17-27 (discussing human rights litigation in other countries); cf Arrest Warrant
of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 51 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Oda) (noting that "the past few decades have seen a gradual widening in the scope of the
jurisdiction to prescribe law" and listing circumstances where extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
has been found to exist). Some scholars have actively encouraged the spread of U.S. approaches.
See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Expanding Remedies for Human Rights Abuses: Civil Litigation in
Domestic Courts, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 119, 138 (Kelly D.

Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000) (encouraging the spread of transnational human rights
litigation beyond the United States).
88 For a recent article that provides a good overview of the legal issues, see Saira Mohamed,
Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275

(2010). For a discussion of humanitarian intervention and territorial sovereignty, see Helen
Stacy, RelationalSovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2035-37 (2003).
89 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the purpose of the United Nations is "[t]o maintain
international peace and security"); id. at pmbl. (stating that the goal of the United Nations is "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to establish conditions under which
justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law
can be maintained"); see also Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, Nov. 1, 1943, in 1
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 1943, at 755, 756 (1963)

(noting the intent of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China to
establish an international organization "for the maintenance of international peace and security").
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using or threatening to use force in international relations. 90 Exceptions
to this prohibition existed only when self-defense was required in face
of an "armed attack," 9 1 or when the Security Council authorized
intervention. 92 While the United Nations Charter encourages states to
promote and respect human rights, 93 because of its territorial
imperatives, international law prohibited unauthorized humanitarian
intervention. 94
More recently, however, some have been willing to look beyond
the law and override territorial sovereignty as a way to save threatened
populations through the use of military force.95 In the 1980s and 1990s,
mass atrocities against civilians perpetrated by warring factions pushed
many human rights groups to lead the charge to stop armed conflict,
even when doing so was of dubious legality. 96 Growing acceptance of
the idea that force must be used to prevent atrocities 97 "fuelled calls for
For an overview of international law relating to the use of force, see MICHAEL BYERS, WAR
LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT (2005).
90 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state . . . .").
91 U.N. Charter art 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.").
92 U.N. Charter arts. 42, 53.
93 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (stating that one of the United Nations' purposes is the
"achieve[ment of] international co-operation in ... promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights").
94 See BYERS, supra note 89, at 92-103 (concluding that unauthorized humanitarian
intervention is prohibited under international law); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN NATO, and
InternationalLaw After Kosovo, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 57, 70 (2000) (explaining that international
law prohibits humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization); Bruno Simma,
NATO, the UN and the Use ofForce: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1999) (concluding
that unauthorized intervention violates international law). See generally Mohamed, supra note
88, at 1282-84. The International Court of Justice has rejected the legality of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention in at least one case. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 134 (June 27) ("[W]hile the United States might form
its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force
could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect.").
95 Thomas G. Weiss, Using Military Force for Human Protection: What Next?, in
MULTILATERALISM UNDER CHALLENGE? POWER, INTERNATIONAL ORDER, AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE, supra note 3, at 376; Alicia L. Bannon, Comment, The Responsibility To Protect: The
U.N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157, 1158 (2006). For a
discussion of whether humanitarian intervention reflects the demise of the territorial state and the
end of sovereign equality, see CHANDLER, supra note 5.
96 See Mohamed, supra note 88, at 1317 ("Unauthorized humanitarian intervention is a
practice by states of exempting themselves from international law."). See generally NICHOLAS J.
WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
172-284 (2000) (describing humanitarian intervention in the context of Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda
and Somalia).
97 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (Sept. 13, 1991) ("It is now increasingly felt that the
principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded
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humanitarian interventions in the Balkans, Rwanda, Burma, Burundi,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and the Darfur region of Sudan," among
others. 98 Human rights scholars assert that intervention in the internal
affairs of other states is now affirmatively required under international
law to prevent genocide and other atrocities, and that states can waive
their right to territorial sovereignty if they ignore human rights abuses
within their borders. 99 Illustrative of how much change occurred in the
shift away from territoriality, some scholars urge foreign military
invasions even absent human rights abuse,100 while still others have
justified not just intervention, but full foreign occupation, on human
rights grounds. 0 '
C.

Reasons for DiscardingTerritoriality

The move away from territoriality and the embrace of nonterritorial methods for governance occurred for a number of reasons.
One was pragmatic: treaties and multilateralism take time. 102 Human
as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated
with impunity."); see also SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED
NATIONS & COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY (2005) (describing support for the right of

unauthorized, unilateral humanitarian intervention); SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS INAN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 202-12 (1996) (same).
For an overview of the issues, see INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT).
98 Jide Nzelibe, Courting Genocide: The Unintended Effects of HumanitarianIntervention,

97 CALIF. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2009).
99 See, e.g., Mitchell A. Meyers, A Defense of Unilateralor Multi-LateralIntervention Where
a Violation of InternationalHuman Rights Law by a State Constitutes an Implied Waiver of

Sovereignty, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 895, 912 (1997) ("[T]he United States, and other states,
have a treaty obligation to intervene unilaterally when violations of international human rights
law occur. Not only is this argument a defense for United States unilateral intervention, it also
presents such intervention as a binding obligation."); see also Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of
Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 516-17, 524 (1990)
(approving of unilateral intervention given the "unraveling of statist conceptions of international
law"); W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination:Construing CharterArticle 2(4),
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984) (arguing for the right of a state to use armed force to overthrow a
despotic government); W. Michael Reisman, UnilateralAction and the Transformations of the
World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem ofHumanitarianIntervention, 11 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 3, 17 (2000) (approving of unilateral humanitarian interventions that "manifestly fail a test of
formal legality under the UN Charter" and arguing that "this situation represents [an] important
advance[]").
100 For an extreme example, see James W. Smith III, UnilateralHumanitarian Intervention
and the Just Cause Requirement: Should the Denial of Self-Determination to Indigenous People
Be a Valid Basisfor HumanitarianIntervention? Yes, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 699 (2007) (calling

for military action, even in the absence of human rights abuses, when indigenous groups have
been denied the right to self-determination).
101 For an overview, see GREGORY H. Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION (2008).
102 Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and ContraryPractice,in THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 531, 533-34 (Jerzy Makarczyk
ed., 1996) (describing the "slow and cumbersome" nature of treaty negotiation as a reason for the
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rights treaties particularly were viewed as cumbersome and slow, and
even ineffective if countries asserted too many reservations. 03 Also,
treaties and multilateral agreements sometimes have lacked meaningful
enforcement mechanisms.104 Frustrated with the slow pace of progress,
the human rights community perceived non-territorial methods as an
attractive way to more rapidly achieve change and effective
enforcement. 0 5 Relatedly, the use of transnational law in its myriad
forms became a way to exert global influence without having to worry
over the constraints and mutual obligations that treaties and state-tostate lawmaking involve.106
Globalization and changes in
communication and technology compounded the pressure for change, as
it became easier for like-minded groups to interact and territoriality,
from a descriptive sense, became less important.
Territoriality also had troubling baggage, which made it easy to
attack. Some states invoked territorial sovereignty to shield outside
criticism and scrutiny of internal state practices. 0 7 Territoriality had
formation of customary international law); cf Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past,
Present,and Future of InternationalLawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1241
(2008) ("[C]ompared to congressional-executive agreements, treaties have weaker democratic
legitimacy, are more cumbersome and politically vulnerable, and create less reliable legal
commitments."); Beth Lyon, The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention:
An Overlooked Opportunity to Change the "Brown Collar" MigrationParadigm, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L . L. & POL. 389, 413-14 (2010) ("Seven human rights treaties are pending on the Foreign
Relations Committee calendar and six of them have been pending for more than 10 years.").
103 For criticism of the U.S. approach to reservations, see Krisch, Unequal Power, supra note
68, at 388-89 (noting that "the practice of reservations is so important to the US that the Senate
has urged the President not to accept any treaty provisions excluding them"); see also JOSEPH D.
BECKER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF NATIONS: PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN

COURTS 41 (2001) (describing how in the 1990s, "the United States ... adopted the practice of
attaching reservations (or their equivalent) to ratified treaties"); Margaret E. McGuinness,
Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 759 (2006) (arguing that even with treaties that the United States has
ratified, the United States "has become more sophisticated in its use of reservations,
understandings and declarations to limit its obligations under the central human rights regimes").
For a recent, more optimistic perspective, see Tara J. Melish, From Paradoxto Subsidiarity: The
United States andHuman Rights Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 389 (2009).
104 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:An IntegratedTheory of International
Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 489-91 (2005) (describing how international law often lacks
enforcement and contrasting enforcement in domestic lawsuits).
105 Koh, supra note 48, at 2602. Dean Koh's work builds, in part, on the public law litigation
work by Abram Chayes in the 1970s. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
106 Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in
InternationalLaw, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 135, 156, 162-63 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003); see also Krisch, Unequal
Power, supra note 68, at 369.
107 CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 128-29 (noting how "[t]he core concept behind international
law, sovereign equality, is seen as a legal fiction for abusers of power to hide behind" and quoting
theorists who view sovereignty as the "central barrier to peace and justice" because it provides "a
'cloak of impunity"'); Catherine Powell, Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 201, 206-07 (1999) (criticizing government invocations of territorial

2011]

REHABILITATING TERRITORIALITY

1121

also historically been closely associated with colonialism and foreign
imperialism. 08 Western ideals of territorial sovereignty were initially
associated only with the "civilized" European nations. 109 Indigenous
groups, for example, historically had few rights under international law
because they did not qualify as territorial nation-states." 0 International
law "regard[ed] the cultural survival, territorial integrity, and selfdetermining autonomy of indigenous peoples as matters within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the settler state regimes.""' This use of
territoriality was either antithetical to human rights ideals, or at least
problematic for human rights organizations seeking to cultivate new and
broader alliances with indigenous groups. The territorial sovereignty of
the nation-state in the 1980s also became associated (mistakenly)112
with the new right's neo-liberal economic policy, which human rights

sovereignty as a way of limiting compliance with international human rights law); see also THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 97 (describing an emerging trend to redefine state
sovereignty not as a privilege against foreign scrutiny, but as the responsibility to protect human
rights and dignity).
108 CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 123-24; see also Christopher Clapham, Sovereignty and the

Third World State, 47 POL. STUD. 522, 522 (1999) ("Westphalian sovereignty provided the
formula under which territories which did not 'count' as states according to the criteria adopted
by the European state system could be freely appropriated-subject only to their capacity to
conquer the incumbent power holders-by those which did count.").
109 S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ININTERNATIONAL LAW 26-28 (2d ed. 2004); see
also Will Kymlicka, Theorizing Indigenous Rights, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 281, 284-85 (1999)

(describing the "saltwater thesis" and noting that "internal minorities [were] not defined as
separate 'peoples' with their own right of self-determination"); Sundhya Pahuja, The
Postcoloniality of International Law, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459, 462 (2005) (describing the

Eurocentric nature of international law).
110 ANAYA, supra note 109, at 23-26; see also Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights
of PoliticalParticipationand Self-Determination:Recent InternationalLegal Developments and
the Continuing Strugglefor Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 579, 580 (1992) ("Indigenous

peoples are entrapped peoples-enclaves with distinct cultural, linguistic, political and spiritual
attributes surrounded by the dominant society.... Indigenous peoples are truly 'nations
within."'); Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative
and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 59 (1999) (describing how

indigenous peoples became what scholars have characterized as "entrapped peoples" or "nations
within" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
111 Roger A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiersof InternationalHuman Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms ofIndigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 672; see

also ANAYA, supra note 109, at 26 ("The major premises of the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth century positivist school ensured that the law of nations, or international law, would
become a legitimizing force for colonization and empire rather than a liberating one for
indigenous peoples."); cf Lawrence Rosenn, The Right to be Different: Indigenous Peoples and
the Quest for a Unified Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1997) (book review) ("Americans have

favored the ideal of unitarian nationhood without relinquishing their romance of community.").
112 For those in the human rights movement who are most concerned about the effects of neoliberal globalization, it is somewhat ironic that the protests are often against global financial
institutions, which themselves have promoted the erosion of the territorial state. For a discussion
of this irony, see Acharya, supra note 34, at 107-08 (describing strategies of "'counter-hegemonic
coalitions"' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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groups viewed with inherent distrust.l13 And lastly, territoriality as a
concept of law had been repudiated in the United States in a host of
contexts." 4
These changes dovetailed with another shift in focus. As human
rights groups sought to reach out and ally themselves with indigenous
and environmental groups, it became convenient to distance the
movement from the original architects of territorial theories of
international law." 5 "An earlier [male] WASP establishment" was
largely responsible for crafting international law in the immediate postWorld War II period.116 More recently though, a new generation of
scholars, which included more women and minorities, sought to
distinguish themselves by focusing more on "[i]ssues of social and
economic justice, the treatment of women, minorities, and indigenous
peoples, and environmental and human rights concerns" that at one
point had been relegated to the margins." 7 In this context, the move to
a new approach seemed logical.
But the embrace of non-territorial approaches to human rights also
can be viewed through a different lens. It is a story of U.S. domestic
political struggles playing out in both the national and international
arena." 8 As conservatives in the 1980s came to push back on a
domestic civil rights agenda, liberals turned to the international arena as
113 See Paul O'Connell, On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-Liberal Globalisation and
Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 483, 483 (2007) (arguing that "one cannot be committed to
the protection of fundamental human rights and at the same time acquiescent in the dominant

model of globalisation," and that neo-liberal globalization "is inimical, both in theory and
practice, to the protection of human rights").

For a discussion of how both neo-liberals and

human rights activists sought similar goals, see Maxwell 0. Chibundu, International Human
Rights and the International Law Project: The Revolving Door of Academic Discourse and
PractitionerPolitics, 24 MD. J. INT'L L. 309, 321-22 (2009).
114 For a more detailed discussion of these trends, see Parrish, Changing Territoriality,supra

note 28 (describing the rejection of territoriality in the personal jurisdiction context); Parrish, The
Effects Test, supra note 14 (describing the rejection of territoriality in the legislative jurisdiction
context). See generally RAUSTIALA, supra note 6.
115 Klug, supra note 43, at 88 ("[The] recognition of the right to self-determination became not

only the lodestar of the international human rights framework but also the means to question the
authority of states over people, and eventually over individuals.").
116 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, in GLOBAL
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL
ORTHODOXY, supra note 48, at 306, 316.
117 Slaughter, Breaking Out, supra note 48, at 25.
118 For an in-depth analysis, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING INVIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1996); DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 25; and Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth,
From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of the Field of International Human
Rights, 2 ANN. REv. L. & SOC. SCI. 231 (2006) [hereinafter Dezalay & Garth, From the Cold War
to Kosovo]. See also Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization:InternationalLaw as an Extension of
Domestic Political Conflict, 105 N.W. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at

http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1690735 (explaining how U.S. partisan dynamics between
Republicans and Democrats has "helped spawn and restrict the scope of international legal
commitments").
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a way to project influence abroad and to strengthen domestic
positions.1 9 The Cold War had been central to the construction of the
international human rights field because both conservative and liberal
domestic groups saw human rights as a way to promote democratic
regimes friendly to the United States.120 The end of the Cold War,
however, was marked by the fraying of old alliances. Unable to easily
garner sufficient support for international treaties, non-territorial
approaches allowed human rights activists to reach out to a broader
range of sub-state institutions (courts, local governments, etc.) that
appeared more sympathetic to the human rights cause than did the
federal executive during the Reagan and Bush administrations. The
language of human rights also gave domestic interests moral authority
and external legitimacy that was useful in domestic political
struggles.121 The attack on territoriality might even be viewed as a
particular form of post-Cold War U.S. hegemony: a more palatable way
of building empire through law rather than through armies and guns.
Some of these trends were likely motivated as much by
convenience and familiarity than any grand theory. The increased use
of the Alien Tort Statute provides a good illustration of this.122
American lawyers graduating from elite law schools, who felt a

119 Makau Mutua, Human Rights International NGOs: A Critical Evaluation, in NGOS AND

HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 151. The author describes:
The human rights community, whose activists and leaders are mostly Democrats or
sympathetic to the Democratic party, in the case of the United States, or Social
Democrats and Labor Party sympathizers in Europe-liberals or those to the left of
center in Western political jargon-viewed with alarm Reagan's and Margaret
Thatcher's push for free markets and support for any pro-Western government,
notwithstanding its human rights record.
Id. at 158. See also Dezalay & Garth, supra note 116, at 310, explaining:
[L]abor unions and environmental groups in the United States today take their fights
for influence over domestic policy into transnational arenas such as NAFTA and the
Multilateral Investment Agreement. Success in the transnational arena helps particular
groups build domestic legitimacy and protect their national power and influence from
erosion through transnational decision making and rule construction.
120 In the early days, liberal and conservative groups were largely allied out of convenience,
using human rights as a tool in Cold War politics. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 25, at 60-73
(connecting the human rights strategy with the Cold War and the 1950s foreign policy
establishment); see also Andras Sajo, New Legalism in East Central Europe: Law as an

Instrument of Social Transformation, 17 J.L. & SOC'Y 329, 330 (1990) (explaining how liberation
of Central Europe meant curtailing the power of states); cf Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregationas a
Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988) (describing how Cold War politics was a key
motivation behind desegregation).
121 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 25; David Chandler, Expanding the Research Agenda of

Human Rights: A Reply to Bellamy, 7 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 128, 137-38 (2003); Dezalay & Garth,
From the Cold War to Kosovo, supra note 118.

122 Koh, supra note 69, at 2364-65 (describing "a growing acceptance by litigants of United
States courts as instruments of social change" and arguing that this was one of two trends that
"engendered a new generation of transnational public law cases"). For a description of the
changing role of courts in the United States, see Chayes, supra note 105, at 1281.
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connection with the human rights community,123 were more at ease with
litigation than treaty negotiation. They had cut their teeth and had
become experienced litigating public law civil rights claims. 124 They
were familiar with the federal judiciary, and comfortable turning
there. 125
II.

LIMITATIONS OF NON-TERRITORIAL MODELS

Non-territorial approaches to global governance and human rights
enforcement have their advantages. But legal scholars often overplay
their advantages and reflect less on their limitations. This Part attempts
to remedy this oversight. It also seeks to highlight two concepts that are
often mistakenly conflated as one. Globalization has made territorial
borders less important as a descriptive matter. That change, however,
does not necessarily mean that territoriality must play a lesser role in
law.1 26 On the contrary, territorial approaches are consistent with
progress in human rights and may be important as a way to constrain the
excesses of a globalized world.
A.

Legitimacy

A number of reasons exist for why norms created at the sub-state
or transnational level are perceived to be less legitimate than norms
developed through multilateral state-to-state agreement. Because
multilateral treaties are a product of negotiation and consent,127 they are
123 Dezalay & Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power, supra note 56, at 367 ("There is

mobility in the human rights community, between the human rights community and the
foundations that support it, and between the elite human rights organizations and the legal
academy.").
124 Chayes, supranote 105. For a discussion of this phenomenon with lawyers associated with
the civil rights movement, see Dezalay & Garth, From the Cold War to Kosovo, supra note 118,
at 246.
125 See generally Dezalay & Garth, ConstructingLaw Out of Power, supra note 56. For a
general discussion, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an
Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMvITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31 (Austin Sarat

& Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
126 Cf RAUSTIALA, supra note 6, at 117-21 (noting that while "it is tempting to interpret [the

growth of extraterritoriality] as a simple story of legal rules tracking the deepening of
globalization," this account is "incomplete and in some senses misleading" in part because earlier
waves of globalization did not result in extraterritoriality).
127 See v note 30, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341 (noting that treaties only create obligations and
rights through consent); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,Human Rights,
and ConditionalConsent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 436-37 (2000) (explaining how states are only
bound to treaty obligations after providing consent and how this is "[o]ne of the most established
principles in international law"); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
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less likely to be viewed as being hegemonically imposed than are
unilateral, extraterritorial domestic laws, and for that reason, are more
easily enforced.1 28 Weaker states, which are granted formal equality in
negotiating international multilateral agreements, see themselves as
having greater influence in multilateral processes and thereby are drawn
to treaties. While "[m]ultilateralism and multilateral institutions may
not be the quickest, most efficient or decisive producers of normative
change," they "make fundamental transformations legitimate and
peaceful." 29
In contrast, transnational rules (such as international norms derived
from domestic decision-making or NGO-developed soft law) are often
viewed as a form of legal imperialism, and for that reason alone are
seen as illegitimate. 130 Other countries view extraterritorial domestic
regulation-even in the name of human rights-to be antithetical to
democratic self-governance.131 Human rights litigation is no longer just
an American phenomenon.132 As foreign lawsuits become more
prevalent,133 it is likely that Americans will similarly react negatively to
attempts by other countries to impose their conception of human rights

THE UNITED STATES pt. 1, ch. 1, intro. note (1987) ("Modem international law is rooted in

acceptance by states which constitute the system.").
128 Cf James C. Hathaway, America, Defender ofDemocratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 121, 129 (2000) (criticizing various forms of unilateralism and noting that "[w]hatever breadth
is sacrificed by insistence on evidence of consent is, in my view, more than compensated for by
gains in both political legitimacy and meaningful enforceability that accrue from an
understanding of international law as a system of consent-based rules and operations").
129 Acharya, supranote 34, at 113.
130 RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

ORDER (1964) (discussing how retaliation can occur based on extraterritorial domestic actions);
see Bradley, supra note 83, at 461 (explaining how in the human rights context, "other nations
may retaliate by allowing suits against US government actors").
131 Mark P. Gibney, The ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Law: The Perversion of
Democratic Governance, the Reversal of InstitutionalRoles, and the Imperative of Establishing

Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 297, 308-12 (1996) (describing the
undemocratic nature of extraterritorial laws); Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The
ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding
MultinationalCorporationsto Domestic and InternationalStandards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.

L.J. 123, 132-33 (1996) (explaining that extraterritorial application of the law is undemocratic and
"represents a vastly different conception of the law than what we have in the domestic realm");
see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319, 346 (1996) ("Even assuming that the
defendant-alien's country has consented to this law on the international plane, there is no
evidence that this consent extends to domestic enforcement in the United States or any other
country.").
132 See supra notes 86-87.
133 See,

e.g.,

Belgium

Restricts

'Genocide Law,'

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2921519.stm

BBC

NEWS

(Apr.

6,

2003),

(describing suits brought against George H.W.

Bush and Ariel Sharon); Jan Arno Hessbruegge, An Attempt to Have Secretary Rumsfeld and
Others Indictedfor War Crimes Under the German Volkerstrafgesetzbuch, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec.

2004, http://www.asil.org/insight041213.cfm.
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law on the United States.13 4 Foreign judges are viewed by many in the
United States with inherent distrust.13 5
Territorial sovereignty is also important for a definitional reason
that relates to legitimacy. Human rights are not easy to define and
represent contested ideals over which groups will continue to
struggle.13 6 They often reflect both religious and secular ideals.13 7 And
debates exist over the legitimacy of first generation (civil and political),
second generation (economic and social) and third generation
(collective, environmental and developmental) rights, as well as the
inherent tensions in defining these rights.' 38 Additional debates exist
over the classification of negative and positive rights, and issues of
universality and cultural relativity.139 Jeremy Rabkin has explained it
this way:
If we could all agree on a universal church, we might want to
establish bishops of that church as authoritative monitors on our
governments. But we do not all agree. Most of us may agree, in
broad terms, on many moral and religious premises. But we do not
agree on all the details nor on the conclusions that should follow
from these premises in particular circumstances. These
disagreements can sometimes matter a great deal.140

134 POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM, supra note 27, at 228 (noting that "American
legalism does not extend very far from its shores" and that Americans do not support decisions
unless made by "American courts, which are staffed by Americans who share American values
and interests").

See generally Alfred P. Rubin, Can the United States Police the World?, 13

FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 371, 374 (1989) (explaining how imposing a U.S. version of
international law "creates a defensive reaction in even our allies .... It creates a precedent and
sense of righteousness in others who would apply their laws and their versions of international
law to Americans whose actions they do not like.").
135 See Elmer J. Stone & Kenneth H. Slade, Special Considerationsin InternationalLicensing

Agreements, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 161, 169 (1988) (explaining that United States and foreign
parties both fear discrimination in each other's respective court systems and prefer arbitration as a
"more impartial and neutral way to resolve disputes"); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage
Jurisdiction?Historical Foundations and Modern Justificationsfor Federal Jurisdiction over
Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 32-35 (1996) (discussing bias against

foreign citizens).
136 See DELAET, supra note 19, at 14 ("Ultimately, human rights are not something concrete
that we can simply define, identify, and implement, although human rights activists and scholars
certainly wish for such simplicity."); Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of
Human Rights, 20 HUM. RTS Q. 201, 203 (1998) ("What makes certain rights universal, moral,
and important, and who decides?").
137 PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EvOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS

SEEN 4-28 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the different religious, philosophical and other ideals that
inspired those campaigning for human rights).
138 Discussion of the generations can be found in PETER R. BAEHR, HUMAN RIGHTS:
UNIVERSALITY INPRACTICE 6-7 (1999).
139 See Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Human Rights, CulturalRelativism and Legal Pluralism:
Towards a Two-Dimensional Debate, in THE POWER OF LAW IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD:

ANTHROPOLOGICAL ENQUIRIES 115, 122-23 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2009).
140 JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 163 (2005).
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Territorial approaches in international law provide a convenient
(although by no means perfect) way of organizing and allowing these
debates to play out, as well as a mechanism for reaching compromisewithin certain parameters. Viewed differently, territorial approaches
allow individuals and communities a way to freely construct their own
conceptions of the good and live according to them.141
Compartmentalizing these debates through a state-centric system of
laws permits rights to be reconciled with internal cultures and norms
prior to being brought to the international arena.142 International
multilateral institutions in turn provide forums where "sovereign states
can come together to share burdens, address common problems and
seize common opportunities." 43 In many ways, the state-centered
system is a foundation for democratic self-government and selfdetermination, even if decisions made within those states are not always
human rights friendly.
B.

Longevity and Stability

But legitimacy is not the only concern; longevity is of equal
importance. The struggle to advance human rights is not intended to
realize fleeting gains, but rather to instill long-term global reform and
respect for human dignity. Human rights based on sub-state, nonterritorial approaches are less likely to have the staying power that more
traditional multilateral, state-centric approaches do.
The multilateral norms and institutions that territorial states create
are less vulnerable to later shifts in power; they will thus be relatively
stable even if the power of states that are generally favorable to human

141 See MERVYN FROST, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY

(1996) (arguing that human rights are constructed within particularist communities through
dialogue and democracy). An increasing body of work demonstrates the benefits of allowing
human rights to develop in localities. Globalization-and the circulation of ideas and peoplemeans that locals are increasingly attuned to international human rights and locally can build
consensus for human rights positions. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry et al., Law From Below:
Women's Human Rights and Social Movements in New York City, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 101
(2010) (exploring how human rights provide important resources for American grassroots

activists). Recent analysis has detailed the difficulties ofhumanitarian intervention sponsored by
NGOs. LINDA POLMAN, THE CuSis CARAVAN: WHAT'S WRONG WITH HUMANITARIAN AID?
(Liz Waters trans., 2010) (describing the unintended, although devastating, results ofNGO efforts
to provide humanitarian aid).
142 A variation of this approach has been advanced in a parallel context relating to tribal self-

governance, even in the face of illiberal practices. See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and
Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799 (2007).
143 Shashi Tharoor, Saving Humanity from Hell, in MULTILATERALISM UNDER CHALLENGE?

POWER, INTERNATIONAL ORDER, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, supra note 3, at 21, 31.
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Multilateral
rights concerns, like the United States, decline.'"
institutions are similarly more likely than sub-state and transnational
norms to preserve, for some time, an order that reflects existing human
rights preferences.1 45 Strong territorial states are essential for effective
enforcement of human rights norms against multi-national and
transnational corporations. Because history has shown that the success
of human rights is intrinsically tied to domestic political battles, the
strength of transnational actors, like human rights NGOs, is likely to
wax and wane.146 They obtain strength as alliances of convenience are
made, but then those same alliances will be quickly discarded when
later politically expedient.147
Even if the above were not of concern, related pragmatic
considerations also suggest the greater advantage of multilateral,
territorial approaches to international law. Those who seek to erode or
bypass the state are unlikely to succeed. The state-centric model has
Historically, human rights
shown considerable resilience.14
organizations have existed as a counterweight to the state only until
actors in those organizations have succeeded in gaining power. At that
point, the key players invest in supporting, rather than undermining, the
state and the new leadership within the state.149 To the extent that the
organizations have not achieved power within the state, the
transplantation of human rights norms often fail. 50 The human rights
movement remains integrally "structured around the U.S. state and the

144 Krisch, Unequal Power, supra note 68, at 373, 377-78 (noting how multilateral treaty
regimes "are less vulnerable to later shifts in power" and are "relatively stable even if the
hegemon declines").
145 Id.; cf Pierre Klein, The Effects of US Predominanceon the Elaborationof Treaty Regimes
and on the Evolution of the Law of Treaties, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 106, at 363, 363-65 ("The influence exerted
by a particularly powerful State on the treaty-making process may therefore have an important
impact on the shaping of international law .... ").
146 Alfred van Staden & Hans Vollaard, The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a PostTerritorial World?, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 165, 182
(Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002) ("[Nlonterritorial governance will survive only if it is embedded
within a secure legal and political framework compelling States to abide by the standards of
conduct and committing them to maintain regional or world order.").
147 See generally supra note 118.
148 Acharya, supranote 34, at 109. Acharya asserts:
The territorial integrity norm faces no powerful challenge nowadays, having survived
post-Cold War challenges in Eastern Europe and Kosovo. And despite the ongoing
demands for Security Council reform, states will pragmatically accept inequality in
their foreign relations as long as unanimity/consensus remains the principal decisionmaking rule in most other multilateral institutions, and the nonintervention norm
constrains Western intervention in their domestic affairs.
149 Dezalay & Garth, ConstructingLaw Out ofPower, supranote 56, at 368.
150 Id For a general discussion, see James Q. Whitman, Western Legal Imperialism: Thinking
About the Deep HistoricalRoots, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 305, 306-07 (2009).
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strategies that are used in U.S. politics."151 More telling, as influential
as transnational NGOs have become, they still lack the powers of
traditional domestic interest groups.152
This resilience plays out in another way. Once reforms are made, a
strong territorial state becomes critical for maintaining respect for
human dignity. In fact, human rights discourse, although suspicious of
the territorial state, usually always relies on a strong territorial state to
provide basic civil, political, economic and social rights.1 53 As David
Kennedy has described it:
By consolidating human experience into the exercise of legal
entitlements, human rights strengthen the national governmental
structure and equates the structure of the state with the structure of
freedom. To be free is ... to have an appropriately organized
state.154

In contrast, weak states often have among the poorest human rights
records. 5 5
C.

Competing Voices and Uncomfortable Pluralism

A non-territorial approach is also problematic because it promotes
a degree of pluralism that sits uncomfortably with the goals of most in
the human rights community. Until recently, because of their sheer
151 Dezalay & Garth, From the Cold War to Kosovo, supra note 118, at 253 ("The issues that
are put on the international human rights agenda, through the same logic, are issues that can gain
attention in the media and in the academies of the United States-human rights, the environment,
ethnic cleansing and violence against women are scrutinized today as were torture, apartheid, and
disappearance tied to U.S.-supported dictatorships in Latin America in an earlier day.").
152 CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 59 ("[W]ith neither a membership capable of influencing
elections, nor the financial capacity to make donations or influence election campaigns, human
rights NGOs lack the powers of traditional interest groups in the domestic political sphere."
(citing DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 169 (2000))).

153 David Kennedy, The InternationalHuman Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 101, 113 (2002). Kennedy opines:
Although the human rights vocabulary expresses relentless suspicion of the state, by
structuring emancipation as a relationship between an individual right holder and the
state, human rights places the state at the center of the emancipatory promise.
However much one may insist on the priority or pre-existence of rights, in the end
rights are enforced, granted, recognized, implemented, their violations remedied, by
the state.
Id.
154 Id
155 Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity,State Failure,and Human Rights, 46 J. PEACE RES. 163,

163-64 (2009) (noting how, on balance, weak states typically have worse human rights records
and arguing that state failure must be taken seriously when diagnosing the causes of human rights
abuse); Sigrun I. Skogly & Mark Gibney, TransnationalHuman Rights Obligations, 24 HUM.
RTS. Q. 781, 783-84 (2002) (describing the "crucial role of a strong and organized state" for
fulfillment of human rights); see also Gregory H. Fox, Strengtheningthe State, 7 IND. J.GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 35, 76-77 (1999) (exploring the benefits to strengthening weak, developing states).
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number, human rights organizations have dominated international
society.' 56 Human rights groups have been able to develop international
norms within the field on their own terms. But this phenomenon is
changing for a number of reasons. For one, other organizationscorporations,' 57 environmentalists, indigenous groups and others-have
begun to push their own agendas, with their own demands for a seat at
the international table. Just as domestically, civil rights groups were
opposed by a conservative counter-revolution, so too are countermovements developing in the international arena. 58 Alliances are also
fraying within the human rights community itself, as it becomes more
developed. 159
A globalized world where many actors create international norms
is unlikely to be a positive development for human rights. Most human
rights organizations have a particular vision of human rights: it is a
westernized (often U.S. or European) vision, focused more on civil and
political rights than economic and social rights.160 The generation of
norms has been controlled by a small number of countries, with a group
of like-minded organizations, and in a limited number of fora. Since
156 See generally George E. Edwards, Assessing the Effectiveness of Human Rights NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs)from the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st Century:
Ten Attributes of Highly Successful Human Rights NGOs, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 165, 169-92

(2010) (providing an extensive discussion of human rights NGOs); Michael H. Posner & Candy
Whittome, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 269, 270-73

(1994) (providing an overview of the development of human rights NGOs).
157 Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case of Hegemony and CounterHegemony, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN
LEGALITY, supra note 7, at 92, 92. Shamir explains:
Multinational corporations (MNCs) dominate the global economy, accounting for twothirds of global trade in goods and services. Of the one hundred largest world
economies, fifty-one are corporations.... As a result of their vast wealth, MNCs have
accumulated significant political and cultural powers .. . [that] often surpass that of
national governments.
Id.
158 See Michael Ignatieff, The Attack on Human Rights, 80 FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at

102, 115-16 (describing challenges to human rights from resurgent Islam, from within the West,
and from East Asia). One example in the United States was the emergence of Sovereigntist, neorealist or revisionist scholars in the 1990s. Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw, supra note 28,
at 815-16, 822-27.
159 See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414,426 (1998) (describing

how indigenous group and human rights groups support one another, but that the support "is
tempered by unresolved concerns about consistency with other liberal precepts, and these
concerns appear quickly in the face of such concrete issues as relations between group autonomy
and individual human rights").
160 A number of theorists have explained how human rights norms bolster powerful Western
states, while delegitimizing others. See, e.g., DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
POLrCS (2d ed. 1989); see also DELAET, supra note 19, at 209 ("Relativist critics of the concept
of human rights argue that, despite its secular language, international human rights law is
fundamentally shaped by Christian doctrine and values ... [and] is often inconsistent with
political and cultural realities in many non-Western settings.").
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World War II, this has been beneficial for human rights. It has allowed
the message to be controlled and a consensus over what rights are
"universal" to develop. Promoting greater participation threatens to
undermine this fragile consensus. Foreign courts may well be less
likely to share the human rights community of liberal values. 161 Even
European versions of human rights can be starkly different than
American ones.162 And even U.S. courts "have tended to adopt very
narrow interpretations of rights protected under international human
rights and humanitarian law treaties."1 63
This concern can be viewed from a different angle. In the
international sphere, the United States has been successful over the last
sixty years in promoting a particular vision of human rights. This may
have been empire building and legal imperialism in disguise, but it
imposed a legal perspective often favorable to the respect of human
dignity and respect for rights. But if law migration becomes
prevalent,' 6 4 the human rights community may well be uncomfortable if
the norms being created are illiberal, non-western and perhaps counter
to traditional concepts of individual rights.165 There is little reason to
believe that organizations in other states (some not friendly to human
rights concerns) will not equally be able to influence and effect change
in a post-territorial pluralistic legal system.166
161 This is true, for example, with the "global rise in religious fundamentalism." Riley, supra
note 142, at 806. After all, law is embedded in the culture and history of a nation and its peoples.
See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 42 (Isaac Kramnick ed., W.W.

Norton & Co. 2007) (1835) (explaining that social condition is the source of laws).
162 See Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, Structural Constitutional Principles and
Rights Reconciliation, in CITIZENSHIP INAMERICA AND EUROPE: BEYOND THE NATION-STATE?

206 (Michael S. Greve & Michael Zoller eds., 2009) (describing the difference between
American and European approaches to rights).
163 Bradley, supra note 83, at 466 (arguing that U.S. federal judges have used judiciallycreated doctrines to limit, not advance, human rights litigation); David Sloss, Using International
Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 48 (2006).
164 See Peter J. Spiro, Globalizationand the (ForeignAffairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.

649, 727-30 (2002) (asserting that globalization has restructured how nation-states exercise their
powers and has left the "United States more vulnerable to the imposition of international norms,"
and opining that "no country-not even the supposed sole superpower-can resist or insulate
itself from global forces").
165 For a leading analysis of the problems of tolerating illiberal groups in the context of
American Indian tribal sovereignty, see Riley, supranote 142.
166 See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dollarizing State and Professional Expertise:
TransnationalProcesses and Questions of Legitimation in State Transformation, 1960-2000, in
TRANSNATIONAL

LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES

197, 199

(Michael Likosky ed., 2002) (describing importing and exporting of ideas and norms); cf
POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM, supra note 27, at 228 (arguing that "before long"

China, Russia, India, and Brazil "will be able to advance their views about international lawviews that will no doubt serve their interests" and noting that "Russia has quickly learned that
pliable human rights language and the precedents of Kosovo and Iraq can be turned to its
advantage"). See generally MUNCK, supra note 8, at 77 ("[W]hile a weaker nation-state may
seem an advantage in the short term to a contestatory movement it does, at the same time, remove
the sovereign power that could be made accountable for human rights. The new transnational
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That other states and organizations can influence change is
significant. No "universally accepted philosophical justification for
human rights exists." 67 Not even all NGOs are sympathetic to a
western version of human rights,168 not to mention that human rights
causes may be subject to capture by groups with very different political
agendas. 169 In fact, it may be that governments are already controlling
to a significant degree the agendas of human rights NGOs.o70 To the
extent that local courts become the primary promulgators of norms,
those norms will likely reflect the diverse political, economic, cultural
and ideological forces that shape each state's unique culture and
identity.17 1
Said differently, the disaggregation of the nation-state may lead to
a pluralism that we are uncomfortable with. In many ways, the
proliferation of non-state actors and the use of non-territorial
approaches to human rights law raise the very problem of fragmentation
that international law scholarship has begun to grapple with.1 2 A plural
legal order can lead to unhelpful norm conflict,173 inconsistency within
managers of globalization-such as the WTO-are, for their part, notoriously unaccountable for
decisions they take that may impactfundamentally on human rights." (emphasis added)).
167 DELAET, supra note 19, at 209.
168 See Benda-Beckmann, supra note 139, at 116 ("[A]nthropologists and nongovernmental
organizations have also shown and defended the relativity and variability of social organizations
and their cultural values, which often were not in conformity with the ideal notions expressed in
many human rights.").
169 For an example, see Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture:
Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655 (2010)
(describing how prostitution-reform debates have influenced law and policy to prevent human
trafficking). See also Nandita Sharma, Anti-Trafficking Rhetoric and the Making of a Global
Apartheid, 17 FEMINIST FORMATIONS 88 (2005) (describing how trafficking of women into
prostitution can unite women's groups, foundations, and the religious right). For a discussion of
how human rights NGOs were captured in the African context, see OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR,
LEGITIMIZING HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS: LESSONS FROM NIGERIA 123-50, 219-20 (2006)
(describing how human rights NGOs working in Nigeria were influenced by foreign groups and
suffered a "popular legitimization crisis").
170 CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 60 ("These studies suggest that it is governments and
international institutions, experimenting with new forms of international regulation, that are
controlling the agenda of NGOs, rather than the other way around.").
171 One example that may cause concern is Iran's reported enactment of legislation permitting
lawsuits against the United States. See Stephens, supra note 70, at 441 ("[I]n response to a
judgment against Iran, that country reportedly enacted legislation authorizing suit against the
United States for abuses committed during the 1953 coup d'etat."); see also Bradley, supra note
83, at 461 ("[I]n November 2000, Iran's parliament enacted a law that allows Iranian 'victims of
US interference since the 1953 coup d'etat' to sue the United States in Iranian courts.").
172 See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: PoliticalEconomy
and Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007). See generally
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion
of International Law, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, May 1-June 9, July 3Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682; GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (Apr. 13, 2006)
(finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).
173 See Marko Milanovid, Norm Conflict in InternationalLaw: Whither Human Rights?, 20
DUKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 69 (2009).
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case law, forum shopping and "may jeopardize the unity of international
law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State relations." 74
Extraterritorial solutions inevitably lead to a patchwork of inconsistent
adjudications as different courts and organizations from different
countries approach international issues using different laws and
procedures.s7 5 Territoriality therefore becomes a way not to topple the
status quo, but to preserve a human rights approach that took root after
the Second World War.
Indeed, an increasing number of pluralism scholars who encourage
pluralist dialogue are quick to point out that their vision of governance
is unlikely to be embraced by those who favor human rights.1 76
Humanitarian intervention is one example. While many human rights
groups supported NATO's bombing of Kosovo, Russia's invasion of
Georgia on the same purported humanitarian grounds was roundly
condemned.17 7
This point about pluralism connects to another one. Human rights
advocates have a tendency to present the development of human rights
as a teleological process, with a degree of inevitable evolution. In some
ways, the characterization of the post-war period experiencing a
gradual, predetermined evolution to greater human rights recognition is
connected to theories of universalism. This sort of predetermined
inevitability, however, has never proven true.' 78 Human rights have
flourished, largely because they have been a useful tool for those in
power, and as a way to promote U.S. foreign policy. 7 9 Human rights

174 See H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the Int'l Court of Justice, Speech to the
General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 30, 2001).
175 Parrish, Reclaiming International Law, supra note 28, at 866 (describing this
phenomenon).
176 For an example, see Paul Schiff Berman, GlobalLegal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1235 (2007) (noting that "a pluralist approach to mechanisms, institutions, and practices for
managing hybridity is unlikely to fully satisfy anyone" and that "[h]uman rights advocates will
prefer a stronger emphasis on universal norms"). For background on legal pluralism, see Gad
Barzilai, Beyond Relativism: Where is Political Power in Legal Pluralism?, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 395, 396-99 (2008) (describing legal pluralism); Paul Schiff Berman, The New
Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Scl. 225 (2009) (describing "global legal pluralism");
and Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869 (1988) (arguing for two kinds
of legal pluralism).
177 See generally Gregory Hafkin, Note, The Russo-Georgian War of 2008: Developing the
Law of UnauthorizedHumanitarianIntervention After Kosovo, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 219 (2010).
178 Cf FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (famously
and incorrectly suggesting the "end of history" and the triumph of liberal democracy).
179 CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 62 (arguing that the end of the Cold War encouraged Western
states to use the language of human rights to justify and legitimize greater intervention abroad);
Dezalay & Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power, supra note 56, at 355, 371-72 (arguing that
investment in human rights was an investment in political power). For additional exploration of
this, see DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 25; and Dezalay & Garth, From the Cold War to

Kosovo, supra note 118.
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have been embraced when strategically advantageous. 180 To strengthen
and see progress, human rights organizations have to exploit these
marriages of convenience. Territorial models provide a foundation for
doing so.
III. REHABILITATING TERRITORIAL MODELS
The foregoing has attempted to show that non-territorial
approaches have their limitations: that global governance based on
extraterritorial regulation may be unfavorable to the human rights field.
This Part attempts to tease out what re-embracing territorial models of
governance would require.
A.

DistinguishingConventionalAnalyses

As an initial matter, it may be helpful to distinguish the position
articulated here from more conventional assessments. The usual
critique of human rights approaches is either that international law is
illegitimate,18 ' or that human rights law threatens U.S. independence
and sovereignty, or that human rights norms are problematic because
they reduce the political autonomy for non-western peoples.182 The
political autonomy point is often coupled with a lament that human
rights law represents a distinct kind of legal imperialism by liberal
western elites.183 This Article rejects these assessments.
First, to the extent these critiques convey valid concerns, they are
amplified with non-territorial approaches. International human rights
created through treaty-based, multilateral norms, pressure states to
become more democratic and liberal. Instead of unilateral imposition, it
180 It is unclear whether, even in the United States, the complete human rights agenda would
ever prevail. CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 60-61 ("[I]n the mid-1990s, polls showed that only a
minority of the United States public backed human rights promotion as an important foreign
policy goal, well behind stopping the flow of illegal drugs, protecting the jobs of US workers and
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons." (citation omitted)); see also FORSYTHE, supra note
52, at 143.
181 See supra notes 24, 27. For an overview of conventional critiques of international law, see
Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public

Law, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1791, 1803-08, 1824-30, 1845-52 (2009).
182 See supra note 26.
183 See Johan Galtung, The Universality of Human Rights Revisited: Some Less Applaudable
Consequences of the Human Rights Tradition, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE: A GLOBAL

PERSPECTIVE 152 (Asbjom Eide & Bernt Hagtvet eds., 1992) (discussing how human rights may
be perceived to be a tool of Western imperialism); Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human
Rights and Cultural Relativism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 379, 390 (Patrick

Hayden ed., 2001) (noting the charge that human rights is a form of Western imperialism).
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requires common agreement and mutual consent. A state agrees to
impose restrains on unilateral action, because by so agreeing other states
do the same, thus better preserving domestic interests in the long run.
Whatever force exists behind critiques of international law, they are
amplified in the context of unilateral domestic actions. Although
hegemonic imposition may always exist in a territorial system, at least
formal equality exists for all states, regardless of military or economic
inequities. 184
This Article, however, breaks more sharply from these traditional
critiques. Unlike the traditional attack, this Article does not condemn
international human rights law or international law in general. On the
contrary, it supports it. Nor does it condemn the ambition that there can
exist higher obligations that should apply to all states.
For
sovereigntists and realists, the mere participation of unelected NGOs in
the international law-making process makes the norms created as a
result of that participation undemocratic and illegitimate. 8 5 In contrast,
the problem as suggested here is not that the norms human rights NGOs
create are illegitimate, but that they will always be perceived by some as
illegitimate. More importantly, as the number of non-state actors
increase, many of those groups are likely to advance positions that are
inconsistent with human rights approaches to global issues. Indeed, it is
not that NGOs should not be heard as some scholars urge.186 Rather, it
is that we should have very little confidence that states will hear the
voices of NGOs that we want them to hear.
The position that the human rights field would do better returning
to territorial approaches is also contrary to what cultural relativists and
pluralists urge. Human rights law may well be a hegemonic imposition
of western values and ideals. But the human rights community should
not shy away from that reality. Human rights discourse is incompatible
with many forms of cultural pluralism. Human rights means something,
and presumably those in the human rights community believe strongly
in the values not because they are believed to be universal (they
probably are not), but because substantively they reflect norms and
values that the community believes in. If that means rejecting illiberal
value and denying some cultural relativism, so be it.
In responding to these critiques and to garner greater legitimacy,
human rights organizations have promised greater participation and
more, not less, inclusiveness. But the greater concern should be the
184 Admittedly, the equality is formal only. David Slater, Geopolitical Imaginations Across
the North-South Divide: Issues ofDifference, Development and Power, 16 POL. GEOGRAPHY 631
(1997).
185 Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International
Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L.
91(2000).
186 Id
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opposite. It is not that human rights are undemocratic, but that nonterritorial approaches lead to a proliferation of unaccountable actors.
Political autonomy and democratic self-government depends on a
Illiberal
particular version of human rights being respected.
governments and actors inhibit the capacity for self-rule and meaningful
self-determination. Non-territorial approaches do not improve these
sorts of changes, but rather permit illiberal and despotic leaders and
groups to gain a greater voice and to shape human rights norms
themselves. Territorial based approaches, in contrast, are not about
weakening the State, but rather about holding states accountable for the
commitments the states themselves have made.
B.

FavoringMultilateralSolutions

So what is to be done? This Article urges that to meaningfully
advance protection of human rights over the long term, the human rights
community should re-embrace multilateral, state-to-state solutions as
the primary way to solve global human rights challenges. In the
humanitarian context, the human rights community should insist on
adherence to the rule of law and respect for the United Nations Charter.
Attempts to steer around legal constraints lead only to poor precedent,
undermine the rule of law and provide support for the belief that
international law is solely used for instrumental ends. Human rights
groups should also be much more reluctant to promote domestic legal
actions against foreigners as a method for human rights enforcement.
At a very basic level, a global human rights regime is premised on
strong, territorial states-not withering ones.' 87
As Jeff Dunoff
explains:
Civil and political rights . . . often require the state to provide

relevant institutions, such as a legislature or an independent
judiciary. Moreover, the state may be required to take positive steps
to ensure that a right is enjoyed or protected against infringement by
private parties.

More importantly, . . . [states must satisfy] basic

human needs and well-being.... [T]he underlying vision is that of
an activist state, not a hands-off night watchman.' 88

187 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human Rights?, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L.

125, 129, 132 (1999) (arguing that a human rights regime presupposes interventionist, activist
states); cf T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION,

THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 12-18, 194 (2002) (explaining the continued validity of

territorial sovereignty and that "the international regime of national states is not about to
collapse"; "[n]ational sovereignty may be somewhat less secure these days, but it is still the
strongest game in town").
188 Dunoff, supra note 187, at 129-30.
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In fact, as the number of non-state actors increases, some with resources
greater than those of many states,189 territorial states become critical to
protecting basic freedoms. The fight against international crime
syndicates, human traffickers, large multinational corporations, and
other transnational non-state actors requires states with effective
enforcement mechanisms. For all the talk and rhetoric surrounding nonterritorial approaches, so far strong territorial states have been a
prerequisite to long-term human rights enforcement and protection.
A different point can be made. Some in the human rights
community have viewed the spread of neo-liberal globalization as
antithetical to human rights progress.1 90 Neo-liberalism is founded on
two core theses. First, that "the best government is that which is least
involved in the affairs of society."'91 Second, that "the international
order functions best when it minimizes the relevance of national
boundaries and national political institutions to the activities of
members of the 'international community."' 92 For those who see neoliberalism as creating an environment not conducive to human rights
protection, reinforcing the value of national boundaries and state
institutions becomes a way to constrain the excesses of neo-liberal
globalization.
But aside from these foundational points, those in the human rights
field should take other concrete steps to rehabilitate territorial-based
law. First, human rights groups should present a unified stance that is
wary of extraterritorial domestic litigation, such as Alien Tort Statute
litigation, where foreign defendants are sued or prosecuted for conduct
occurring abroad. In most instances, exercising this kind of jurisdiction
is inconsistent with traditional notions of self-determination and
democratic self-government.1 93 As described above, these suits threaten
to create a global system that encourages other states to turn to domestic
actions that may promote norms we are uncomfortable with or that are
contrary to human rights goals.194 Indeed, the human rights community
189 Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 273, 279 (2002); see also Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization,

and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1999) ("Giant companies have
become largely independent of states, of the states that created them, of the states in which they
operate. Some of them are replacing, or at least jostling, the states themselves in the state
system.").
190 See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 113.

191 Chibundu, supra note 113, at 322.
192 Id.

193 For a more detailed discussion of the undemocratic nature of extraterritorial domestic
litigation, see Parrish, The Effects Test, supra note 14, at 1483-88.
194 Alfred Rubin once described the problem as follows:
Placing ourselves in the position of world policeman for our version of international
law creates a defensive reaction in even our allies .

..

. It creates a precedent and sense

of righteousness in others who would apply their laws and their versions of
international law to Americans whose actions they do not like.
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itself has long recognized that the suits could be "wielded for political
purposes" rather than for remedying human rights abuses. 195
This suggestion is not as provocative as it might at first appear.
Taking a stand against pursuing U.S. domestic litigation over foreign
activity would have little impact on human rights enforcement. These
sorts of lawsuits are rarely successful, as they face a number of
procedural and substantive hurdles.196 And even when a plaintiff
obtains a judgment, it serves usually only a symbolic or media
function,' 97 as the chance for enforcement is slim.198 It is also unclear
whether the perceived illegitimacy of these types of lawsuits taints other
aspects of the human rights agenda. The suits are usually viewed as
imperialistic and unfair.199 As the International Law Association
explicates:
States exercising jurisdiction on this basis may be accused of
jurisdictional imperialism because universal jurisdiction is only
likely to be exercised in powerful states with regard to crimes
committed in less powerful states.200

Rubin, supra note 134, at 374.
195 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Human Rights Claims vs. The State: Is Sovereignty Really
Eroding?, I INTERDIsc. J. HuM. RTS. L. 107, 117 (2006) (noting that "those with the greatest
capacity to act to protect rights are also those likely to have ulterior motives or other agendas"
(citing RICHARD FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 36 (1980))).
196 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, ArbitratingHuman Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 509
(2008) (explaining how "perpetrator responsibility remains elusive" and that "[o]ne of the
principal problems with litigation against individual perpetrators is that, with very rare exception,
these low-level offenders are not subject to personal jurisdiction and are generally judgment
proof' (footnote omitted)); Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum
Non Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 71-72 (1998) (describing
forum non conveniens hurdles to successful litigation); Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign
Immunity, supra note 24 (describing the foreign sovereign immunity barriers to bringing suit
against a foreign government official for alleged abuses committed abroad); Michael D. Ramsey,
InternationalLaw Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J.
271 (2009) (describing prescriptive jurisdiction limits on human rights litigation).
197 Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 10, at 106 (stating that the principal benefit in human rights
suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act may be the "public attention they generate"); cf Randall S.
Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to
Climate ChangeRegulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 398 (2006)
(noting that "the outcomes of [private environmental citizen] suits [are] often more symbolic than
substantive"). For a discussion of the benefits of U.S. human rights litigation, see Christiana
Ochoa, Access to U.S. FederalCourts as a Forumfor Human Rights Disputes: Pluralismand the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 631, 640-47 (2005).
198 Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw, supra note 28, at 864 nn.247-50 (citing sources and
discussing diplomatic protests, blocking and clawback statutes, and other methods of preventing
effective enforcement of U.S. judgments).
199 Sriram, supra note 195, at 117 ("To the degree the proceedings take place only in the
courts of powerful Western states, and often in those of former colonizers, the argument that
cases are selective, and even driven by imperialistic agendas, can be and has been raised.").
200 INT'L LAW ASS'N, COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE, LONDON
CONFERENCE (2000): FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN
RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES 19-20 (2000).
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And even when not viewed as legal imperialism, U.S. human rights
suits face legitimacy concerns because of a double-standard: U.S. courts
more commonly permit foreigners to be sued, but do not permit human
rights lawsuits against American actors. 201
This does not mean that proponents of human rights should discard
all domestic suits. Domestic human rights litigation in the United States
that seeks to impose liability when the U.S. government, U.S.
corporations or other U.S. entities engage in human rights abuse,
whether in the United States or abroad, should be promoted and
U.S. domestic litigation against U.S. defendants is
developed.
consistent with traditional territorial notions of international law. 202
And contrary to suits against foreigners for overseas activity, there is no
perceived democracy-deficit with U.S. actors being subjected to U.S.
law.203 More broadly, to the extent domestic litigation can address
human rights abuses, it should be filed either in the defendant's home
country or in an appropriate supranational human rights tribunal. 204
Second, proponents of human rights should redouble their efforts
to promote multilateral human rights treaties and effective enforcement
of those treaties through international institutions. This is not to suggest
that territorial sovereignty insulates a state's treatment of its own
citizens. Permanent sovereignty does not exist. On the contrary, a
government's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international
concern, not state prerogative. The issue is what methods should exist
to enforce and compel compliance with human rights norms. Although
empirical analysis is rare, the analysis that does exist suggests that at
201 See Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al., Comments on Chapters 4 and 5, in UNITED STATES
HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 106, at 176, 183

("[T]he United States claims simultaneously to subject other States to respect for international
law while freeing itself as far as at all possible from the constraints that same law imposes on
it."); see also Bradley, supra note 83, at 469 ("The US government often assesses other nations'
compliance with international human rights standards, but it generally has been unwilling to
apply international human rights law inward against domestic governmental actors.").
202 A number of scholars have urged that U.S. constitutional obligations should follow the
U.S. government regardless of where it acts. See Neuman, supra note 15; see also Raustiala,
supra note 15.

203 Nationality jurisdiction is a well-accepted basis for asserting jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) (1987); see also Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A] state
has jurisdiction to prescribe law governing the conduct of its nationals whether the conduct takes
place inside or outside the territory of the state."). Unlike foreigners, U.S. citizens are not
outsiders to U.S. politics and have a formal vote.
204 Dubinsky, supra note 82, at 308-09 (finding that supranational tribunals, such as the five
geographically-specific atrocity courts created by the United Nations, are procedurally
advantaged over domestic courts because they were "written with genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity in mind," and can offer regional expertise as well as continuity). For
some concerns over international tribunals, see Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword Is the
Proliferationof InternationalCourts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.

& POL. 679, 679 (1999).
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least among democratic nations, ratification of human rights treaties is
associated with better human rights practices. 205 Developing human
rights treaties is important not only because of the pull of legal
prohibitions, but also because of the important expressive functions
treaties serve 206 : "[T]he act of ratification and the continued fact of
membership in [a] treaty regime may also serve to slowly transform the
country's practices as it gradually internalizes the norms expressed." 207
CONCLUSION

Scholars from a wide range of disciplines have condemned
territorial approaches to international law and its state-centered focus.
Territorial, state-centered conceptions of international law are
commonly viewed as outdated, antiquated and ill-equipped to handle
the demands of a globalized world. The human rights community has
embraced this view, encouraging non-state actors to play a more
prominent role in global society, promoting the use of unilateral
domestic lawsuits under expanded conceptions of universal jurisdiction,
and ignoring territorial borders when necessary for humanitarian
intervention.
This Article has challenged that now conventional wisdom to
suggest that, in the long-term, the human rights community may be
better off promoting strong, territorial-based approaches to international
law. Not only are strong states important to enforce and promote
human rights, but also non-territorial approaches threaten, over the

205 Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935,
1940-41 (2002) (finding "evidence suggesting that ratification of human rights treaties by fully
democratic nations is associated with better human rights practices" and hypothesizing that
"human rights treaties may have positive effects on ratifying countries over the long term,
creating public commitments to which human rights activists can point as they push nations to
make gradual, if grudging, improvements down the road"); see also LOUIS HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979) (famously noting that "almost

all nations observe almost all principles of internationallaw and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time"); Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a
Diference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) (discussing the impact of international human rights
law on state behavior); Kristen B. Rosati, International Human Rights Treaties Can Make a
Difference, 28 HUM. RTS. 14 (2001) (discussing the United Nations Convention Against Torture
and the U.S. practice under its immigration laws).
206 Hathaway, supra note 205, at 2021.
207 Id. at 2022; see also Cassel, supra note 205, at 122 (explaining how "[i]nternational human
rights law also facilitates international and transnational processes that reinforce, stimulate, and
monitor" domestic dialogues over human rights norms); Garth, supra note 21, at 7 ("[I]nterviews
around the globe suggest that the issues that get on the international human rights agenda are
likely to be those that can gain the attention of the media in the United States, U.S. academics, the
Ford Foundation, and other domestic players .... ).
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long-term, to undermine the advances already made by the human rights
community.

